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ABSTRACT
On January 22, 1982, the Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS) announced their intention to cancel two of their five nuclear
power plants in construction. These two power plants, WNP-4 and WNP-5,
were 24% and 15.9% complete, respectively, and had already cost $2.25
billion to build. Over the thirty year repayment period on the bonds
used to finance WNP 4/5, the 88 small public utilities which each handle
partial ownership of the plants will have to pay a total of about $7
billion on the debt. In April of 1982, it was decided to slow down the
construction of one of the remaining three WPPSS nuclear power plants
for a period of up to five years. The slowdown at WNP-1 will cost about
$1 billion per year. The remaining two nuclear power plants, WNP-2 and
WNP-3, are being completed at a cost of three times their original
estimates and several years behind their original schedules. Although
the nuclear power industry has had many problems recently, WPPSS pro-
jects have been among the hardest hit, and therefore worth looking at
in-depth in order to gain a better understanding of the problems with
which they are faced.
This study was accomplished through both interviews and research of
written materials. The results are an overview of current thought on
the problems facing the nuclear industry and a case study of the WPPSS
situation. The main problems for WPPSS were changing regulations by the
NRC, higher than expected inflation and interest rates, and labor
problems including strikes.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Fred Moavenzadah,
Title: Professor of Civil Engineering
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CHAPTER I -- INTRODUCTION
The age of commercial nuclear power generation began in the 1960s
with high hopes and dreams for an inexpensive domestic supply of energy
for the United States for many years to come. It was felt that once a
few of the technical bugs were worked.out, standard, mass-produced
designs were achieved, and learning curve effects began to take effect,
the peaceful use of nuclear energy could eventually make this country
independent of foreign sources of energy and lead us down the path of
even greater prosperity.
With these hopes in mind, electric utilities throughout the country
had ordered 209 nuclear power plants by 1974.5 However, beginning in
the mid-1970s, the picture began to look quite different. From 1974
through 1978, the Nation's electric utilities cancelled 184 planned,
large (greater than 250 MWe) generating units, including 80 nuclear
plants. The capacity of these 184 plants would have been equivalent to
about 26% of the Nation's existing electrical generating capacity as of
April 1979.56 From 1978 through 1982 about 45 nuclear power plants have
been cancelled, and no new plants have been ordered since 1978. Among
those plants not cancelled, most have experienced considerable delays.
Lead times have increased from an average of 61 months in 1964 to 141
months in 1982.52
This thesiS attempts to uncover some of the important reasons behind
these cancellations and delays, and examines the current state of the
nuclear industry. The five major problems causing cancellation or delay
of nuclear power plants are:
1) The sharp decrease in the rate of increase in the demand for electri-
city since 1974. Up to 1974, demand increased at about 7% per year,
but has actually been declining in some areas in recent years.
2) Difficulty in financing powerplant construction, since construction
costs have increased dramatically and since utilities are not able to
attract the necessary capital without paying more for it than in the
past. This problem is compounded by the fact that many utilities are
not allowed to begin recovering the cost of constructing a generating
unit until it is complete--often 10 to 14 years after the utility has
begun construction.
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3) The regulatory process has often been uncoordinated, cumbersome,
complex, and slow, causing delays and cost increases.
4) Problems surrounding the acceptability and future of nuclear power,
such as public and political opposition and general uncertainty in
the future of safety regulations and waste disposal.
5) Construction problems, such as lack of construction materials and
adequate numbers of skilled craftspeople, and low productivity.
The impacts of powerplant cancellations and delays include:
1) Increasing oil consumption, making the U.S. more dependent on foreign
sources.
2) Jeopardizing the utility industry's ability to provide uninterrupted
electrical service.
3) Increasing electricity rates as consumers bear the added costs of
delays.
On the other hand, there are obvious benefits associated with cancelling
or delaying electric powerplants that are not needed because of reduc-
tions in the projected rate of growth in demand. The costs of plant
cancellations and delays to utility customers may be less than the costs
of a large investment in a completed but underused plant.56
With these ideas in mind, then, this report takes a look at the
current supply side and demand side problems of nuclear power plants in
general, then takes a close-up look at one particularly hard hit util-
ity, WPPSS. The second chapter of this report discusses general supply
side problems with which nuclear power plant owners and builders are
attempting to cope. The chapter is divided into technology, resources,
and management, which are the major areas of supply side problems.
Demand side problems, such as decrease in forecast demand, environmen-
tal, safety, and political issues, are discussed in Chapter 3. Because
many of WPPSS's problems are common with the industry, these chapters
help to understand the WPPSS case in more general terms and in the
context of the larger picture. The next section, Chapters 4 and 5,
deals directly with WPPSS background, its current problems and how they
developed, and ways in which WPPSS is attempting to solve its problems.
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An in-depth look at one specific case is often interesting and helpful
in understanding the way in which problems can develop and the peculiar
interaction of problems which can lead to a very costly failure.
Finally, Chapter 6 will attempt to pull the paper together rationally
and make some helpful suggestions for the nuclear industry.
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CHAPTER 2 -- PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION: SUPPLY SIDE
Technological Problems
Software
During the construction of any state of the art project, changes in
design usually occur quite frequently. In the case of the nuclear power
plant, these changes come from two sources, those mandated as necessary
or recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and those
proposed by the architect/engineer (A/E) of the project.
These changes can often cause a great deal of trouble with construc-
tion in terms of cost and time increases, worker morale problems, and
material procurement problems. Work already in place must sometimes be
torn out or scrapped because it is in the way of the change. Often,
redesign of one component of a system or in a particular area makes a
whole chain of redesign necessary. For example, a decision to increase
the diameter of a feed water pipe within containment may necessitate
relocation or redesign of ductwork and wiring in the immediate area of
the pipe--space is often at a premium in the most critical (and there-
fore most subject to changes due to technological innovation or regula-
tory consideration) areas of a nuclear power plant. New, often special-
ized or custom designed materials or equipment must be ordered, shipped,
and brought to the work location, often causing a considerable time
delay and the late ordering causing higher costs. Further delays result
as worker morale is battered by continual design changes which cause
their previous hard, often exacting and tedious work to be ripped apart.
As we shall see in the labor section of this report, worker dissatisfac-
tion due to change orders is a major cause of poor morale among the
workers which leads to lower productivity.
All these factors lead either directly to cost overruns or
indirectly through time delays. In an effort to save money, the deci-
sion is often made to go ahead with construction out of sequence while
materials are being procured. According to foremen and supervisors on
nuclear power plant sites, however, this out of sequence work only
sometimes leads to a time savings for total system construction. It is
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often so difficult and non-routine to do the work out of sequence that
it ends up taking twice as long or even being practically impossible to
install the material out of sequence. Going back to the previous
example, it might be absloutely impossible to install the piping to
exacting standards if the ductwork and portions of the wiring were
already in place. In fact, part of the in-place work might have to be
removed and replaced once the piping was installed.
At first reading, it may seem that these problemp are real, but
there is little that can be done about them. In the first case, those
changes ordered by the NRC the constuctors must comply and make the
changes if they expect to obtain an operating license someday. Thus, no
matter how costly and how distasteful it may be to make design changes,
the contractor must bow to the wishes of the NRC. But what about the
second type of design change--those called for by the A/E himself? The
A/E will say that all of these costs of redesign and construction prob-
lems mentioned have been considered during the A/E's cost-benefit analy-
sis of the change. In other words, all the costs due to time increases,
direct cost increases and sometimes even labor morale have been weighed
against the benefits in fuel efficiency or safety or materials saving,
etc. properly amortized and weighted through time of occurrence.
However, there is one cost that the industry often does not expli-
citly take into account when weighing the costs and benefits of a tech-
4
nical design change. This is the probabilistic cost that, due to a
design change, or a number of design changes requested by the A/E, the
NRC will see a just reason for pushing back approval of a construction
permit or operating license for the entire plant while they study the
safety implications of these technological design changes. In fact,
there is even a risk that the NRC will not approve the design changes,
causing the entire plant to wait not only for the NRC review, but to
wait while the design is changed again (in the case of the construction
permit) or while the innovation is actually ripped out of the plant and
rebuilt (in the case of the operating license)!
The delay problem may have been heightened in the past few years due
to the extreme load and pressure on the NRC lately caused by TMI and a
large number of plants simultaneously needing operating licenses. Thus,
the NRC may jump on any excuse to get an extension on the time at which
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they have committed to making a decision on the plant (the CP or OL
decision deadline). There is an indication that the industry seems to
be a bit naive of this NRC tendency. For example, during a meeting at
the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) at which the A/E
presented cost-saving design changes to WPPSS and an NRC representative,
the A/E spokesman mentioned that no delays were anticipated as a result
of the changes, which were supposed to save about $100 million on each
of two plants. At the same meeting however, the NRC representative
mentioned that the proposed change would cause a minimum of ninety days
delay in the granting of construction permits for the two plants. 44 At
today's delay costs of about $1 million/plant/day 3 1 , the design change
savings is nearly wiped out, even at the minimum NRC delay and not even
considering the risk cost that the NRC might finally disapprove the
design.
Hardware
Underlying the design changes, or "software" technological problems
discussed above, are often hard technological problems, which must be
solved. To understand these problems, it is helpful to take a look at
the history of nuclear technology and then at the operating records of
current nuclear power plants.
The first nuclear reactors were built, operated, and studied by the
government through the Manhattan Project around 1946. During this early
period of nuclear power development at least nineteen different reactor
types appeared to possess strong potential for commercial development
and received detailed study. Millions of dollars were invested in each
of these systems, and eleven of them reached the point where experimen-
tal reactors were actually built to demonstrate their technology. Most
of these were eliminated as potential power sources, usually for techni-
cal reasons which had not appeared in their early development. For
example, the organic-liquid-cooled reactor looked extremely attractive
until it was discovered in an experimental reactor prototype that the
organic coolant decomposed rather rapidly under the intense radiation of
the reactor core.
By the mid-1950s the list of potential reactor types was narrowed
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down to the two most common today: pressurized water reactors (PWRs)
and boiling water reactors (BWRs). A major factor in the success of the
light water reactors was the extensive technical experience gained
through the Naval Reactors Program that was based on water-cooled reac-
tors. The first commercial power plant, opened in 1957 at Shippingpsrt,
PA, used a PWR that was similar to that used in early nuclear submarines
such as the Nautilus. Both Westinghouse and General Electric, in coop-
eration with the utility industry, built on extensive experience with
the Naval Reactors Program and the AEC Test Reactor Program to build a
series of demonstration plants that went into operation in the early
sixties. These included: Dresden, in Illinois in 1960; Yankee in
Massachusetts in 1961; and Humboldt Bay in California in 1963.
The next generation of power plants was built on a "turnkey" basis
by both General Electric and Westinghouse. Although these plants cost
the two reactor manufacturers over $1 billion in unanticipated costs,
they did transform nuclear power from a series of costly single demon-
stration units to a commercially viable industry. It permitted the
development of some standardized engineering techniques and the buildup
of the necessary engineering force. As the economics of scale became
more evident, the capacity of nuclear power plants was upgraded from
several hundred to a thousand megawatts. Oyster Creek and Nine Mile
Point are usually regarded as the first commercially viable units, not
coming on-line until 1969.
During the late 1960s, utilities began to order plants in large
numbers, and the industry built up the necessary manufacturing capacity
to supply plants at a rate of forty to fifty per year. Optimism for
nuclear power had become so strong that the AEC decided to concentrate
its research effort on advanced reactor types such as the fast breeder
reactor and leave further light water development to private industry.
In retrospect this appears to have been an unfortunate decision, since
just when light water reactors were being installed at a rapid rate, the
agency decided to shift away from research on this technology, including
safety research.8
Thus, we see that early in the development of nuclear power, indus-
try gained the technology from the government through the AEC. By the
1960s, the industry was coming on-line with 1950s government technology.
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In the mid-sixties the industry was concerned with building larger,
economically feasible power plants rather than emphasizing the develop-
ment of existing technology. By the late 1960s, the government nearly
turned its back on safety technology as industry concentrated on gearing
up for production of large numbers of large plants. Thus, it can be
argued that both industry and government were concerned about issues
other than those directly related to developing the nuclear power plant
technology and safety technology.
Beginning in 1972, and with the introduction of the NRC to take over
the AEC's regulatory duties in 1974, a vast number of new regulations
began to be issued, as regulators took a good look at the technical
problems of these new plants. This observation , in itself, seems to
support the idea mentioned above that not enough attention was previ-
ously paid to advancing safety technology. Even after this time,
because of the difficulties previously discussed concerning design
changes during construction, less advanced technology was, and is,
constantly being built into nuclear power plants: with nuclear power
plant schedules stretching out to ten or twelve years now, nearly ten
year old technology is built into plants currently applying for opera-
ting licenses.
But, one might argue, that as long as the technology works, why
worry about it if it is not quite up-to-date? Unfortunately, the answer
can be found when looking at the records of currently operating nuclear
power plants. Although there have never been any core meltdowns or
radiation fatalities due to nuclear power, there has been a persistant
background of literally thousands of small accidents every year. For
instance, in 1977 there were 3,002 small safety-related incidents or
"reportable, occurences", involving nuclear reactors.2 6 Most of these
incidents are not dangerous, but a few have triggered unpredictable,
cascading sequences of errors. These have led to "close calls" such as
the Brown's Ferry fire in 1975 and the accident at Three Mile Island
(TMI) in 1979. Concerning TMI, for example, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Rogovin Report concluded that it came within 30 to 60
minutes of a meltdown.
Since most people would agree that the hallmark of any mature indus-
try is that it eventually shakes off its early record of glitches and
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bugs, we can conclude that the nuclear power industry is still not
mature. In fact, many would argue that we are today operating a large
scale test of an incomplete technology, one in which many of the
glitches and bugs still exist. As we have seen, then, the nuclear power
industry will probably be faced with difficult technical problems for
quite some time due to the fact that the technology was not completely
researched before large scale production of nuclear reactors began.
Resource Problems
Capital
Over the past ten years, both the interest rate and the inflation
rate have risen to levels that were unheard of before the 1970s. These
unpredictably high costs of money and investment, coupled with increas-
ingly long construction schedules have sometimes as much as tripled the
predicted costs of nuclear power plants coming on line today. These
huge cost overruns have created problems with obtaining sufficient
financing throughout the life of a nuclear project, and have begun to
cast some doubts as to the economic advantage of using nuclear power
rather than coal.
For years, the lending rate for municiple bonds was about 6%, but
around 1980., interest rates rose rapidly to about 15%.31 It is obvious
that for billion dollar projects, this increase in the interest rate
will lead to large cost overruns. The inflation rate was also quite
high in the 1970s. Because the inflation rate was about 2.9% during the
1960s, it was difficult for anyone to predict the average 10.3% per year
increase in the 1970s.30 Together, the interebt and inflationary costs
of building a nuclear power plant are now making up about two thirds of
its total construction cost. Figure 2.1 shows the cost breakdown for
nuclear units ordered in the late 1960s and early 1970s.52 These fig-
ures were prepared by the AEC, and were actually quite low. The "A" and
"H" above the June 1969 estimate show the average unit cost and the
highest unit cost as estimated in 1974. The low AEC estimates them-
selves were detrimental to the industry, since many utilities based
their projected nuclear power plant costs on these figures. Figure 2.2,
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prepared by United Engineers and Constructors, shows the trend in cost
estimates for 1967 through 1980; again notice the breakdown of direct.
50
and indirect costs. Figure 2.3 shows the projected costs for a
nuclear power plant coming into commercial operation in 1992 and com-
52
pares these costs against coal plant costs for the same year. In this
projection, done by Ebasco Services, interest and inflation are predic-
ted to mgke up three fifths of the total construction costs, even
assuming that inflation stays at 8%/yr. from 1982 to 1992 and interest
rates go down to 9.5% for the same time period.
It is not surprising, therefore, between the higher time costs of
money and the longer construction schedules (which will be discussed in
the industry level management section of this report) that many utili-
ties are presently facing difficulty in raising enough capital to com-
plete their nuclear projects. Historically, the cost of debt to
electric utilities has been very low, mainly because of their ability to
pass most increases to consumers. For the bondholder, this means a cash
flow sufficient to cover interest payments and any maturing debt, and
the risk of a utility defaulting on its bond repayments has been small.
Recently, however, there has been concern over the financial health of
the electric utility industry. This is caused because of the worry over
long construction delays and cost overruns of new power plants as well
as worry over the safety of nuclear power and whether a utility can go
bankrupt after a nuclear accident such as TMI. Added to these problems
were the rapid increase in oil prices, increasing regulation by states
and the federal sector, and delays in state approval of rate increases.
Thus, as can be seen in Table 2.1, utility long-term bond ratings have
been falling.29 Because its bond rating influences the rate of interest
a utility must pay in order to borrow money, a vicious circle of having
to borrow more and more money to finance debt with higher and higher
interest rates may result over the ten or more year duration of a
nuclear power plant project.
The total cost of a nuclear power plant is figured out before the
decision is made to order one as being the total of construction cost,
maintainance cost, and operating cost. (See Figure 2.4.) The construc-
tion cost is a function of construction duration, interest and inflation
rate, direct and indirect construction costs, and adders due to safety
-U6,
Cost projections for nuclear and coal units coming into com-
mercial operation in 1992. The base costs are reference 1980 costs
used by Ebasco Services, Inc. To these are added escalation during
construction and allowance for funds used during construction (former-
ly interest during construction). EDC was assumed to drop to 8%/yr in
1981 and remain there through 1992. AFUDC was based on the
assumption that money would be available at 9.5%.
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and environmental items ordered by the NRC. This cost is amortized over
a period of time and figured into electric generating rates for this
period of time until it is paid back. Maintainance cost for a nuclear
power plant includes general maintainance and updating of the plant to
meet safety standards and a large decommissioning cost at the end of the
lifetime of the plant. In order to pay this large final cost, a percen-
tage of the anticipated cost is added to the rate base for a number of
years before the lifetime of the plant ends. Operating cost of a
nuclear power plant includes the cost of fuel, workforce, etc., and is
anticipated to rise over the lifetime of the plant due to increasing
fuel and labor costs. The economic attractiveness of nuclear power
depends very much upon what the actual lifetime of a nuclear power plant
turns out to be, since operating costs are relatively low compared to
the initial investment in the plant. Lifetimes for nuclear power plants
are currently estimated to be about thirty years. If this is truly the
case, then, when the mathematics is done, nuclear power is still consid-
ered by most experts to be cheaper than coal power, and it is expected
to stay cheaper.5 '9 '34 '50 '51'52'53 Although there is no evidence to
show that a nuclear power plant's lifetime may be shorter than thirty
years for technological reasons, the NRC may pass so many regulations
applying to existing plants as to make the economic lifetime of a plant
shorter than thirty years.24 Figure 2.5 shows the cost of electricity
generated by nuclear versus coal plants going into commercial operation
in 1992.52 Figure 2.6 shows another author's estimate of coal vs.
nuclear costs, broken down by region of the country for both 1985 and
1990.9
Despite these promising outlooks for nuclear power costs compared to
coal, however, new nuclear power plant orders have virtually ceased, and
cancellations abound. Other problems will be discussed later, but
uncertainty over inflation and interest rates and whether, with falling
bond ratings, the money will be available to utilities for borrowing has
certainly caused major problems when utilities try to estimate the cost
of a proposed nuclear power plant. Suffice it to say that, had interest
rates and inflation not been so high in the 1970s, even with all
nuclear's other problems, costs of these plants would not have been
nearly so high, perhaps only doubling their original estimates.
Decommi
1352
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Workforce
Another factor of nuclear power plant construction that was always
underestimated was the total number of workers needed to finish the
plant construction.3 Large cost overruns were experienced and other
problems caused as productivity at the site decreased and more and more
workers were needed. Undesirable social problems, such as boomtown
effects, were often caused, especially when nuclear power plants were
located at remote sites.
Table 2.2 shows the personnel overruns for 33 representative nuclear
power plants, chosen due to the availability of labor figures for those
plants.3 One striking fact is evident from even a cursory glance at the
personnel overrun column; in every case the actual work force has been
significantly above the original estimate, and in some cases has been
dramatically above the original. Almost certainly, these overruns must
have been associated with escalation of the project costs, since labor
generally runs from 20-25% of direct construction cost of a nuclear
power plant.
Underprojection of manpower requirements has several consequences in
addition to adverse effects on project cost control. There are matters
of labor availability, relations with unions, hiring practices, and
manpower training programs. Because nuclear plants are often sited at
some distance from metropolitan centers with their large labor pools,
schedule penalties as well as cost increases may result as there is
simply insufficient time to bring in the amount of skilled labor
required.
Then there are the socioeconomic impacts of the work force, particu-
larly the immigrant portion, on the communities. The influx of workers
has impact on housing, public services, taxes, and relations with perma-
nent residents. Inaccurate projections of manpower can jeopardize the
ability of local communities to plan courses of action that will meet
the needs of the work force. Also, the mitigation efforts of the utili-
ties, if based on incorrect numbers, can go astray; this can damage
community relations and worker morale.
Even if projections had not been so far off, however, social prob-
lems would probably have occurred anyway. During the construction of a
TABLE 2.2
Comparison of projected and actual peak construction work forces at selected U.S. nuclear power plants.
Projected Peak Actual Peak Personnel Overrun
Plant (year made)+  (year occurred) Actual > Proj. (%) Utility Capacity ++  A & E Constructor
One-Unit Plants
Three Mile Island I 900 (1967) 1775 (1971) 97 Met. Ed.L 792 Gilbert UE&C
James A. FitzpatrIcK 1200 (1967) 1652 (1971) 38 PASNY 821 Stone & Web Stone & Web
Crystal River III 1300 (1972)- 1790 (1973) 38 Fla. Pow 797 Gilbert Jones
St. Lucie I 1200 (1972)* 2025 (1974) 69 Fla. P & L 810 Ebasco Ebasco
Hatch II 1500 (1972) 2300 (1976) 53 Ga. Pow L  795 SCCI & Bechtel Ga. Power
Enrico Fermi I: - 1400 (1972)" 2931 (1979) 109 Det. Ed. 1056 Det. Ed. Parsons '69
Sar & Lundy '74 Daniel '75
Virgil Summer 1000 (1972) 3054 (1976) 205 S. C. E&GL 900 Gilbert Daniel
Shoreham 1500 (1972)9 3300 (1979) 120 Lilco 819 Stone & Web Lilco
Stone & Web
Nine Mile Point II 1200 (1973) 3000 (1979)*b 150 Nia. Mo.L 1100 Stone & Web Stone & Web
Waterford 1200 (1973) 3055 (1979) 155 La. P&L 1165 Ebasco Ebasco
Wolf Creek 1800 (1975) 2260 (1979)=c 26 Kan. G & E 1150 Bechtel Daniel
Kan. City P & L
Two-Unit Plants
Three Mile Island 2200 (1972)1 3120 (1972) 42 Met. Ed.L 792/880 Gilbert & L&C
Gil./Bums/Roe
Joseph Farley 2200 (1972)-d 3500 (1974) 59 Al. Power 860 SCSL and Bechtel Daniel
Diablo Canyon 1530 (1972)- 2470 (1974) 61 Pac. G & E 1084/1106 Pac. G & E Pac. G & E
William B. McGuire 1810 (1972) 2182 (1974) 21 Duke 1180 (2) Duke Duke
Lasalle County 1500 (1972) 2500 (1976)o 67 Com. Ed. 1078(2) Sar & Lundy Com. Ed.
Watts Bar 2320 (1972) 4345 (1978) 87 TVA 1177(2) TVA TVA
Salem 2000 (1973)- 4064 (1974) 103 Pub. Ser. E&GL  1090/1115 Pub. Ser. E&G UE&C
San O-nere 1700 (1973) 3000 (1979) 76 So. Cal. Ed. L  1100(2) Bechtel Bechtel
Grand Gulf 2500 (1973) 4000 (1978)0 60 Miss P & L 1250(2) Bechtel Bechtel
Susquehanna 2500 (1973) 4697 (1978) 88 Pa. P & L 1050(2) Bechtel Bechtel
Bellefonte 2200 (1974) 4403 (1979) 100 TVA 1213(2) TVA TVA
Comanche Peak 1150 (1974) 3850 (1978) 235 Tx. Ut. Gen. Co.L 1150(2) Gibbs & Hill Brown & Root
Seabrook 2300 (1974) 4700 (1980)t 104 Pub. Ser. N.H.L 1150(2) UE&C UE&C
South Texas 2100 (1975) 4650 (1979)o 121 Houston L & PL 1250(2) Brown & Root Brown & Root
Midland 700 (1971) 2776 (1979)*' 296 Consumers Pow 460/811 Bechtel Bechtel
Sequoyah 2200 (1972)1 4882 (1978) 122 TVA 1148(2) TVA TVA
Three and Four-Unit Plants
Oconee 1200 (1966) 2700 (1971) 125 Duke 860(3) Duke & Bechtel Duke
Palo Verde 3100 (1975) 5000 (1979), 61 Ariz. Pub. Ser. L  1270(3) Bechtel Bechtel
Hartsville (4 units) 5000 (1975) 8000 (1980)* 60 TVA 1233(4) TVA TVA
Two-Unit Plants Reduced to One Unit
Phipos Bend 2750 (1977) 2776 (1979)' NA TVA 1233 TVA TVA
Callaway 3000 (1974) 3600 (1980) NA Union El 1150 Bechtel Daniel
Yellow Creek 2600 (1977) 2814 (1979), NA TVA 1285 TVA TVA
The information in this table has come from a wide variety of sources, chief of which have been the NRCs environmental impact statements, the utilities'enwitrmnental
reports, reports on 13 nuclear plants by Mountain West Research, Inc. for the NRC, and NUS Corporation's Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, 12th ed. Additional
uncited information has also come from other sources, primarily personal consultations with knowledgeable individuals.
+ This date is six months earlier than publication date of FES by NRC 'The projection of 900 average employees provided in the CP EIS was adjusted to a
(except 1960sdatal. projected peak of 1500 by the author.
++ MWe net. bReached 2142 workers at the end of 1978 (only 25% completel and was expected to
* Projections made after construction had already begun: these should rise to a peak of 3000.
be closer to actual. cOnly 30% complete, not at peak.
* Most recent projection. dDES published one month earlier projected only 1000.
f Not yet at peak. 'Construction trades only.
NA Not Applicable. fReached 1968 workers in 1977 and projected to rise to 2776.
L Lead utility. SReached 6560 workers in 1979 and projected to rise to peak of 8000 shortly before two
units were postponed.
Ref. 3
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nuclear power plant, several thousand workers are typically needed for
several years. Because of safety considerations and stringent geologi-
cal needs, nuclear power plants are typically located at remote sites,
often very remote. The nearest town may be a village of 1000 people 15
miles from the site. In other words, a nuclear power plant often means
that a town will double in size within one year. Even with advance.
warning and helpful action, towns cannot grow this rapidly without
experiencing many problems. Housing becomes impossible to find for
newcomers as well as previous residents, and rents soar. Temporary
housing is often absolutely necessary, and must be built by the contrac-
tor. Public services, such as police and fire departments, schools,
roads, and utilities such as water and sewer systems are extremely
strained. Taxes increase as property values and rents increase and as
money is collected to pay for public services. Permanent residents may
become quite resentful due to an increase in crime and what they see as
an undesirable change and lowering of morals in their previously quiet
little community. When residents are unhappy, opposition to the entire
project is likely to occur, and, as this report will discuss later,
public opposition can have devastating effects in terms of time and
money.
Another labor problem detrimental to nuclear power plant construc-
tion is the low morale level among workers, frequently causing low
productivity. Low morale is caused by a number of factors, including
high waiting time, rework, repetitive-type work, and lack of identity.
Waiting time occurs frequently at a nuclear power plant site. Because
of the complexity of the construction, there are frequent problems with
installation by the time the plant is actually built. For instance, two
sets of plans, such as mechanical and electrical, may show a part
attached to the same place on a structure or feature an almost impos-
sible tolerance limit for field measurement accuracy. In these situa-
tions, labor in a particular area must cease until a decision is
received from the engineers; the crews are either instructed to look
busy or to move to another work area. Morale problems resulted from
either being ashamed, or bored of just looking busy, or because it was
not often possible to construct something from beginning to end, thereby
losing the pride of workmanship. This problem could be improved by
-23-
having more qualified engineers in the field with better lines of commu-
nication, and by checks, perhaps with experienced foremen, to make sure
requirements are practicable.
Rework is a powerful demotivator. Once it becomes clear to the
laborers that the work they are putting in may all have to be taken out
again, not due to their own errors but due to design changes or errors,
it becomes hard to get any job done right the first time. A good illus-
tration of rework adversely affecting productivity is shown in Table
2.3, where pre- and post-TMI productivity values are shown.
Table 2.3 Manhours per li ear foot, nuclear plants, before and after
Three Mile Island failure.
Before After
TMI TMI
--Pulling electrical cable 0.14 0.23
--Placing cable trays 2.8 6.5
--Structural concrete 17 23
--Formwork 0.8 1.5
For skilled craftsmen, often in the construction business because they
enjoy the variety and challenge of construction type work as opposed to
factory type work, repetitive labor can be quite demoralizing. Because
a nuclear power plant is so large, there are usually large numbers of
each task which must be done, and it is usually quickest to have one
person or crew do only a very specialized service. For example, one
crew of welders could be kept busy doing nothing but simple plate join-
ing welds for a year or more. For a craftsman, this factory type work
can lead to low productivity. Finally, morale was affected by another
size-of-job problem: lack of recognition. Too often on sites, individ-
ual workers and crews are no more than numbers to their superiors, and a
job well done is not noticed and a job done quickly is only rewarded by
more work that is expected to be done as quickly as prior experience has
indicated.
Because reduced morale and the type of problems discussed here can
lead to slow productivity and thus high cost, frequent failure to meet
quality standards and thus safety problems, high turnover, absenteeism,
and even labor strikes, they are and should be of great concern to those
with an investment in nuclear power plants.
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Materials
There are two major ways in which the vast supply of materials
needed for a nuclear power plant may cause problems. First, long pro-
curement delays for highly specialized materials may occur, causing cost
overruns as work is done out of sequence and as inflation affects the
price of materials. Second, materials on site can cause a very big
management problem, as they must be received, labeled, stored, and moved
accurately when and where they are needed for construction.
Any discussion of construction materials for nuclear plants should
begin with the problem of inflation. During the 1970s, the time at
which most U.S. nuclear power plants were being built, the rate of
inflation rose at an average of 10.3% per year. In construction
supplies, the rate was often higher, running up to 300% in some
instances!30
Due to booming construction in the early 1970s, a vast increase in
the demand for nuclear power plants, and the inability of the suppliers,
particularly the foundaries, to keep up with rising demand, there have
been many shortages in the supply of materials for nuclear plants.
Also, due to the strictness and changing nature of regulations, mater-
ials often have to conform to very strict tolerance and/or strength
tests. If a major piece were to fail the test, it would have to be
reordered and either waited for or built around until the replacement
material was obtained. Usually, the materials which are in the most
short supply are those which come from foundaries, especially those
which must be of nuclear grade. For example, in 1974 there was a 68-70
week delivery delay time for nuclear quality alloy castings and a 12-14
month delay for high pressure stainless steel valves. The reactor
vessel and the steel containment liner are probably the longest lead-
time items. Increasing regulations have also caused an increase in the
amount of materials such as steel, concrete, piping, and electrical wire
which must be used. All these factors lead to cost increases during
construction.
Construction plant adequacy is an important management responsi-
bility, since providing adequate facilities is extremely important to
the productivity, efficiency, and morale of the manual and nonmanual
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construction force. First, sufficient space must be set aside for
storage, laydown, and fabrication of materials. Proximity and priority
of space allocation are critical. A two-unit project may require over 6
acres of indoor storage, 61 acres of outdoor storage space, and 85 acres
for fabrication, subassembly, and material staging areas, 15 of which
are in the immediate vicinity of the permanent structures for short-term
material staging. Looking at this huge amount of physical space
required for materials, it is easy to see that some very complex and
accurate system must be required to keep track of these materials. One
company, Bechtel, has come up with a very good system through which each
piece of material which is brought to the site is marked with its appro-
priate in-place location, the structure having been previously broken
down into thousands of work areas. Material handling, storage, fabrica-
tion, and moving to the short-term staging area is thus carried out with
the help of these marked pieces; construction plans show piece numbers
so that it is a simple matter to choose which piece goes where. Also,
it is simple to find all the pieces needed for a particular day's or
week's work in an area by simply getting all the pieces with the common
first few numbers code. Because having to search for needed materials
is sited as being a major cause of low productivity, it is very impor-
tant to handle materials carefully.
Inadequate physical plant requirements have also been a problem
during nuclear power plant construction. With the large underestima-
tions in number of workers needed for a project come underestimations of
requirements for such things as water and electricity supplies and
sewerage treatment facilities. Another facility which needs to be
adequately sized initially is the concrete batching plant on site. Due
to the increases in amount of concrete called for by the new NRC
requirements, many power plants have suffered in cost and schedule lags
with inadequate concrete plants. Both project cost and schedule savings
may result from an adequate initial construction plant investment. The
sizing of equipment and process systems should allow increases in capa-
bility, which experience has shown are often necessary.
Assigning responsibility for construction plant engineering is
important. Design of construction facilities imbedded in permanent
structures or routed underground should be handled by project engine-
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ering and design. This will avoid interference which can result from
shared design responsibility in these congested areas. Other components
of the systems are best designed by construction engineering. Operating
and maintaining the plant deserves special attention. Well defined
operating and maintainance procedures and regularly scheduled monitering
of performance are necessary to assure system reliability and personnel
safety. Providing an efficient workplace is a key management responsi-
bility. Inadequate attention to this concern may severely restrain
construction performance. Conversely, a full-scope construction plant
may improve the productivity of both the manual and nonmanual work
force.
Management Competence
Industry Level
The single largest problem facing the nuclear industry recently has
been increased regulatory requirements and uncertainty in future regula-
tory requirements. Whenever a nuclear power plant is cancelled during
design or construction or whenever a plant's costs are called into
question, regulatory problems, causing cost overruns through delays or
directly through design changes, are cited as the major culprit. Thus,
it is worth looking at the factors which have led to this problem and
discussing some ways in which regulatory problems may be eased or
averted in the future.
The nuclear regulatory system in the U.S. includes many agencies at
many governmental levels. These include the federal Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state public
utility commissions and environmental quality agencies, and local zoning
and transportation authorities. These agencies deal with such diverse
issues as public and occupational health protection, environmental
quality land use, and financial regulation of monopoly utility comp-
anies. For the most part, these agencies are independent and are not
obligated to respect the jurisdiction and commitments of the others.
This fact alone assures a regulatory situation in which it is virtually
impossible to predict what the final decisions will be or when they will
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be made.
Because the NRC is the agency which deals with all nuclear power
plants built around the country and is the agency which gives the
nuclear power industry the most trouble once siting is approved, this
analysis of causes of regulatory difficulties will focus on the NRC.
The NRC was created in 1974 by an act of Congress as an agency which is
to regulate all nongovernmental aspects of nuclear materials to protect
the public health and safety. For nuclear power plants, the NRC has
developed a two-step licensing process involving a construction permit
(CP) that is required before power station constuction can begin and an
operating license (OL) which must be granted before a completed power
plant can begin operation. Three parallel reviews are required for the
construction permit, involving antitrust, safety, and environmental
issues. Two of these, the safety and environmental reviews, are comple-
ted before an OL is issued, and the antitrust review, which is rarely
important, is completed later. The safety review is concerned with such
topics as the adequacy of systems designed to handle accidents and
routine radioactive releases and the extent of the operator's emergency
plans. The review is based on material submitted by the applicant (the
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report or PSAR), and the NRC reviews it to
make certain the public health and safety have been protected.
Because there are no explicit levels of adequate health and safety
which must be protected as specified by law, however, the NRC is given
the task of deciding what level of protection is adequate, an essenti-
ally social decision. The failure of the U. S. political system,
Congress, to provide clear guidance on this issue of adequate levels of
safety has left the decision by default to a trial-and-error process in
which the NRC's decisions are reviewed and frequently modified by the
federal courts. The result is a public health protection system which
many have called inconsistent, uncoordinated, costly, and undemocra-
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tic. The only way the public enters the proceedings is through inter-
vention in the licensing process of each particular plant. The will of
the majority is never expressed directly regarding the appropriate level
of health protection. On the other hand, intervenors in the licensing
process have caused long.and costly delays in specific plants. Many of
these intervenors are simply opponents of nuclear power in general, but
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they try to find specific issues to contest in each plant in order to
hold up the licensing and in hope of making the plant so costly that it
will be cancelled or in hope that other utilities will be scared off
nuclear power due to these observed licensing delays. Some of the
intervenors, however, do raise important questions about deficiencies in
reactor design, construction, and regulation. Public involvement in
nuclear regulation has also reinforced conservative tendencies in the
regulators, which have resulted in such stringent public safety regula-
tions that a nuclear power plant is now about as likely to cause a death
as is a meteor falling from space in any given year (according to WASH-
1400, a controversial report which will be discussed in the safety
section of this report). Although public intervention is not the only
force causing regulations to be so conservative, making nuclear power
plants this safe is not simple and is certainly not inexpensive. Many
knowledgable critics have charged that even the public would not choose
the reactors to be so safe if they knew the large added costs to their
electricity bills to get that tiny extra margin of safety.
There are at least five other factors which have led to increases in
the numbers and strictness of NRC regulatory requirements. 46 First,
there is concern that even with a growing number of reactors, the total
accident probability should be kept quite low. Otherwise, nuclear
expansion could lead to such a high rate of accidents per year, that the
public's confidence in nuclear power would collapse and plants would be
forced to close. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety and other
influential spokesman have advocated the reduction of risk per reactor
as the number of reactors grows. Second, the increases in reactor size
since their inception have brought up concerns over the increases in
potential consequences and probabilities of accidents. Accidents at
larger reactors could have more serious consequences, since they carry
more fuel with a proportionally greater fission-product inventory which
is subject to release and since they have a higher decay heat, causing
much more concern to be leveled at emergency core cooling systems.
Thus, the AEC in 1967 formally stated that protective systems for larger
reactors must have shorter response times, larger capacities, and
greater reliability to cope with the more rigorous demands presented by
large reactors and to keep the margin of safety per reactor to its
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previous high level. Third, the discovery of new safety issues through
government and industry design and licensing reviews has contributed to
the changing and addition of standards. Fourth, reactor operating
experience has uncovered previously undetected safety problems and
underscored the severity of known, unresolved issues. Recently, or
since about 1975, operating experience has become the largest single
source of new regulatory requirements. The accident at TMI alone intro-
duced a large number of new or previously unemphasized generic safety
issues while providing a sweeping reappraisal of safety regulation
transcending the specific design and equipment inadequacies that contri-
buted to the accident. In fact, eleven nuclear power plant owners can
actually point to the post TMI set of requirements as the ones that
forced them to cancel their projects.32 This group of eleven plants
were the ones that had applied for a construction permit before the TMI
accident but had not yet been granted one, and includes Boston Edison's
Pilgrim-2 and Duke Power Company's 3-unit Perkins station. The fifth,
and final, major reason for increased numbers and stringency of NRC
requirements comes from the increases in the size of the regulatory
staff itself. The large numbers of reactors in need of licensing in the
early 1970s led to a larger NRC staff, which in turn permitted a broader
range of safety issues to be examined. It has also led to standardized
review procedures that have tended to raise the stringency of standards
applied to all plants by choosing the strictest standard in use as the
one which would be the standard.
Recently, another problem at the NRC has led to long delays in
processing license applications. For two years following the accident
at TMI no new nuclear plants were given operating permits, as the NRC
staff was devoted to finding the causes of the accident and attempting
to write regulations to assure that an accident of that sort could never
happen again. All of the plants waiting for their OLs and all of them
which applied for OLs during that period caused a huge backup at the NRC
which is only now being resolved.
Changes and growth of regulatory requirements are a major factor in
stretching out the time to completion of nuclear power plants. (See
Figure 2.7.)52 They are also a major factor in increased costs. Accor-
ding to one study done by the U. S. Department of Labor, increased
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FIGURE 2.7
Ref. 52
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regulation on plants beginning construction in 1967 compared to 1974
plants would have increased real costs per KWe of generating capacity. by
69.2% in the absence of learning and scale economies. Actual capital
cost increases were only 54.6% during that period because design learn-
ing and scale economies dampened cost increases.10
Two suggestions to help ease the time and dollar costs of regulation
are fairly widely accepted. The first is the notion of standardization
of nuclear power plant design and the second deals with political issues
and intervention. Standardization would lead to less time for the NRC
to make a decision on CPs and OLs, and to less cost in NRC mandated
design changes and uncertainty. The type of standardization that is
most likely to come about is the acceleration of present trends in the
industry to standardize.49 Only a few large companies are now acting as
A/Es for nuclear power plants, and only a few companies are supplying
nuclear steam supply systems (NSSS). Over the past 25 years, these
companies have taken steps to standardize their designs, and, if they
continue, there may be less than ten standard designs built (except for
site-specific differences). If the NRC would adopt one-step licensing
for standardized plants, this concept would be well on its way. Other,
more radical standardization schemes, such as the design of a "standard
reactor" would involve major changes in both the construction and design
industry and the government. These will probably not be implemented
soon or at all although they would result in even faster and more sure
NRC licensing of plants.
Politically, providing new avenues for intervenors rather than the
licensing hearings would reduce uncertainty in licensing time while
still allowing people to speak up about real problems they feel are
important. Also, establishing an accepted safety goal and using stan-
dard probabilistic risk assessment would help both designers and the NRC
come up with reasonable measures to avert risk. It would also freeze
the moving target of ever smaller allowable probabilities of failure
that the industry has had to contend with. More money and a larger
staff could help the NRC deal with its post-TMI backlog of plants wait-
ing for licenses.
Thus, at the industry level, industry leaders and government must
work together toward greater standardization and more easily followed
and predicted NRC rules.
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Firm level
A discussion of management at the firm level should begin with the
distinction being drawn between public and private utilities. With a
few notable exceptions, su~h as the TVA,65 public utilities' experience
with power has begun at thb transformer. In other words, public utili-
ties in general do not owrnor'operate their own power plants. Private
utilities have long been planning, managing design and constuction, and
operating and maintaining'their own power plants.24
Although public utilit-ies lack experience in and are not structured
for operating even a simplt power plant, many of them have decided to
take on management and op4rating responsibilities for the highly complex
and technical nuclear project. Time after time when a public utility
takes on responsibility fob a nuclear project we hear tales of problems
related to management. Foer example, in 1980 the NRC found Public
Service of Indiana to be lacking in management and management support,
and that personnel involve7 in their Marble Hill plant were generally
neither technically qualified nor experienced.40  This report was made
after the NRC investigated:quality control problems, such as large voids
in the containment concrete at Marble Hill.
Even private utilities would benefit from the hiring of highly
qualified and experienced personnel for their nuclear projects and by
effecting a proper reorganization of their firms for the management of a
complex project.
Just to mention those firms involved in the designing and construc-
tion of nuclear power plants, many of those firms are now switching
over, or including in their programs, plans for maintaining and decom-
missioning nuclear plants.27  Because of current trends of greatly
decreased orders for new nuclear power plants, these firms have decided
to capitalize on what they see as could only be a growing market of
plants in need of updates to meet changing NRC requirements, and start-
ing in about ten years, those that will have to be decommissioned.
Project level
Management at the nuclear power plant project level has been plagued
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with a number of problems, many of them mentioned previously. The
management goal for construction projects has always been good quality,
54high productivity, lower cost, and on-time completion. As we have
already seen, nuclear project managers have never been able to live up
to these goals, and, as time goes on, are in fact failing ever more
miserably to achieve them. Many problems of nuclear power plants invol-
ving especially cost and schedules are mainly external to project
management. However, due to the incredibly complex nature of nuclear
power construction, management is only now fully adjusting to its
demands.
Some problems which could be corrected by effective project manage-
ment have already been discussed in the sections on labor and materials
handling. PM should begin early in the design phase, where designs
which keep in mind difficulties of construction and realistic possible
tolerances should be considered. Building an actual model at this phase
would reduce problems with placement and design of overlapping systems.
Also, calling in experienced foremen or supervisors at this stage would
result in realistic tolerance levels being set for construction accur-
acy. During construction, it is important that materials be tracked
properly and that the jobsite be run as efficiently as possible to
prevent delays. As discussed in the labor section, management often
creates barriers that can make it extremely difficult for workmen to
accomplish a task within an anticipated time and budget. Lines of
communication need to be shortened and speeded, and tools and materials
made available. Project control can become a problem during construc-
tion if too many subcontractors are hired. Because of the maze of
equipment and physical barriers on a nuclear power plant site, having
numbrous contractors tends to cause continual battles over matters of
jurisdiction or over who should be given priority in a specific work-
space. Services are duplicated, hardship claims and complaints are
numerous, and inefficiency creeps in. Furthermore, small contractors
may be unable to handle the complex documentation and strict conformance
to plans necessary on a nuclear project. Because of the need for strict
quality control overall and due to the aforementioned problems, the best
strategy seems to be for one very large and organized contractor to do
most of the work in-house.
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As we have seen, costs and time to completion seem to continually
rise throughout the life of a nuclear power plant project. Without a.
good method of keeping up with these cost and time increases, project
owners can be very surprised when they recalculate the cost of their
project every several years. More importantly, nothing will likely be
done about the causes of these problems if no one knows what they are at
the very least. A sophisticated computer method of handling budgeting
and scheduling seems the most appropriate method of keeping track of
these variables.58  Personnel in the field, close to the problems and
those in the office keeping up with world trends and technical issues,
should combine their knowledge in making up-to-date and realistic pre-
dictions. Good communication between the owner and the A/E or Project
Manager is essential to keep the owner informed of costs and schedules
so that he can obtain proper financing (or make the decision to cancel
in a timely manner, before too much money is wasted).
The Project Management problems common to all construction occur at
nuclear power plants, too. However, the sheer size and complexity of a
large nuclear project, coupled with a moving design target, quality
control and documentation requirements, tax human ability to the limit
in effectively dealing with these special Project Management problems.
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CHAPTER 3 - PROBLEMS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANT CONSTRUCTION-DEMAND SIDE
Decrease in forecast demand
While regulatory difficulties and uncertainties are the most
frequently cited causes of nuclear power plant cancellations, decrease
56in demand is the cause next most often cited. Demand is usually fore-
cast 25 years in advance by large power authorities in each specific
region.48 Growth comes from two sources; an increase in the number of
customers and an increase in the amount each customer uses.
Future forecasts have traditionally been based on past trends.
Between 1945 and 1970, energy use in the U.S. as a whole expanded at
about 3% per year. If historical trends are used to predict energy need
growth from 1975-2000, energy need would be found to double within that
time. Although utilities recognize the uncertainty in a prediction of
this sort, they usually use historical growth as a rough guide for
predicting future growth. Thus, a problem becomes evident for nuclear
power plants that were ordered in the early seventies. The 1960s was a
period of higher than average growth in GNP, and therefore, higher than
average growth in energy demand. In the early 1970s the Arab Oil
Embargo struck, doubling the price of imported oil with the U.S. still
highly dependent upon it. The country was thrown into a recession which
has lasted quite a few years, and the nation's leaders called for con-
servation of energy. Due to conservation efforts, both for patriotic
and economic reasons, energy consumption actually declined over the
years in many areas. Because of the long lead times of nuclear power
plants and because no one was sure how long the recession would last,
some utilities decided to go ahead and continue with their nuclear
projects, hoping for a brighter future in the ten years it takes to
build them. However, many utilities decided to cancel their large
nuclear projects and build plants with smaller generating capacities or
wait and build plants with shorter lead times when they can see that
increased demand is imminent.
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Environmental and Safety objections to nuclear power
Many people today, both scientists and members of the general
public, are quite concerned with what they perceive to be risks associa-
ted with nuclear power production. Health effects, environmental
effects, reactor safety, radioactive waste, and nuclear proliferation
and terrorism are the general concerns most often voiced in opposition
to nuclear power. Unfortunately for the utilities engaged in building
nuclear power plants and for other proponents of nuclear power, public
and scientific objection is most often voiced in the arena of individual
hearings for particular plants. As was discussed in the section on
industry level management and the NRC, this type of public intervention
has often been the source of long and costly delays in nuclear power
plant licensing, and is a contributing factor toward making nuclear
power less attractive for other utilities by increasing licensing uncer-
tainty. Therefore, a brief discussion of each of the concerns listed
above is in order.
The health effects of nuclear power are, from all indications,
negligable and much less serious than health effects of coal generated
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power. A small, but measurable, amount of radiation is released at
each stage of the fuel cycle; mining, milling, transportation, conver-
sion, fabrication, normal reactor operation, and waste management and
disposal or reprocessing and recycling. It is useful to divide these
health effects into two groups--those experienced by the public and
those experienced by workers in the nuclear fuel cycle. Under normal
operating conditions, each reactor year of power production is expected
to involve about 0.2 - 0.5 accidental worker deaths, with roughly half
of this the result of mining accidents and half the result of reactor
construction. Occupational radiation doses are about 1000 - 1500 man-
rem per reactor year. Public health consequences are more difficult to
estimate. Population dose commitments at the present time appear to be
dominated by radon emissions in mining and milling and by routine
.effluent emissions, especially carbon-14, tritium, and krypton-85.
These exposures are obtained mostly from dietary intake of the daughters
of radon-222. The total .population dose is below 1000 man-rem per
reactor year, which corresponds to about 0.2 latent fatalities per
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reactor year. Most public attention, however, is focused on non-normal
reactor operation, or core-melt and breach of containment. These proba-
bilites and the associated health risk are incredibly difficult to
determine. The Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400)45 projected average
consequences of about 0.02 latent fatalities per reactor year; it will
be discussed more in the safety section of this report. These factors
added together would bring the total health risks for nuclear power
plants for workers and public to about 0.6 to 1.0 expected deaths per
reactor year. When compared with risks due to coal-fired plants of
4-100 expected deaths per 1,000 MWe plant year (in the worst case) or
2-10 expected deaths (in the best case, with scrubbers and low sulfer
coal), nuclear power plants are seen to cause much less health risk.
Environmental effects of any kind of power generation include possi-
ble impacts on global climate, local heat pollution, effluents, and land
use for mining. The possible impact on global climate appears to be the
most serious of these considerations. Fossil-fuel combustion has
already lead to an increase of about 0.30 C, largely due to the green-
house effect caused by carbon dioxide.57  This type of heating, combined
with the much smaller effects of thermal output from all types of power
plants, could cause disaster if the overall long-term trend of the
earth's climate will be to become hotter, perhaps causing flooding due
to melting of the polar ice caps. It could, of course, be beneficial if
the overall trend of the earth's present climate is toward another Ice
Age. With regard to local and more immediate environmental impacts, the
situation is somewhat clearer. Nuclear plants tend to heat the immedi-
ate area of generation slightly more than coal-fired plants. Coal
mining uses much more land than does uranium mining, mainly because of
the great difference in the amount of ore it takes to generate the same
amount of power from each. Coal mining also results in acid drainage,
and coal combustion in acid rain that adversely affects the general
environment. On the whole, then, generation of electricity using coal
has much more serious environmental effects than does generation by
uranium.
The safety of nuclear power plants is the central issue in most
debates about whether or not we should use and develop nuclear power.
To simplify discussion in this report, WASH-1400 will be used as the
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basis for a discussion of safety.45 Although this is a controversial
report, recent scientific critiques and comparison with actual experit
ence to date have concluded that WASH-1400 is fairly close to being
correct, or is at least within a factor of four of actual risks and
consequences of accidents.28,47 WASH-1400 concludes that the average
rate-of-loss, taking into account the full range of possible accidents,
is about 0.02 fatalities per year for a 1,000 MWe nuclear power plant.
This is very small compared with one fatality per year from normal
nuclear operations or the two to twenty-five fatalities per year from a
comparable coal plant. Recent research has indicated, however, that the
risk to the public from nuclear accidents is quite small compared to the
financial risk to the utility from accidents. As Figure 3.1 indi-
cates,47 estimates of the expected public risk costs (placing a dollar
value on a human life) are only about one-fiftieth of the utility risk
costs. This model is quite insensitive to changes in the dollar value
placed on a human life or to new findings about WASH-1400 probabilities
or consequences, since most changes will apply both to public and util-
ity risk. From the viewpoint-of a nuclear power plant owner, or
utility, then, this analysis indicates that safety requirements set by
the NRC may not provide adequate financial security to the utility.
Thus, cost/benefit considerations of safety design features will be
incorrect if only public risk is taken into account or if a straight
analysis of expected cost of loss against cost of implementing a safety
feature is performed. Utilities may wish to consider those types of
accidents which could cause a loss of solvency (such as the TMI acci-
dent, which caused no fatalities) to have a higher cost than just the
cost to clean them up. Although it may be difficult for utilities
facing increased regulation by the NRC to look at long-term risks and
impose even stricter regulation upon themselves, this research has
indicated that utilities should build even safer plants but that this
increased safety will not alter the economic attractiveness of nuclear
power.
The management and safe disposal of radioactive waste is a growing
concern for scientists and the public.7 Most high-level waste which has
been generated by nuclear reactors is still stored at the reactor site,
and something must be done in the near future to dispose of or reprocess
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this waste before spent-fuel pools are filled and before reactors must
be decommissioned. People are concerned that the government is not
handling either its own military waste or commerical waste effectively.
Many short-term solutions have proved to be faulty, with transuranic
waste buried in shallow pits and liquid waste leaking into the ground.
Also, government proposed solutions to the problem have so far proved to
be inadequate. Most scientists agree that our best present alternative
for nuclear waste disposal is to bury it in deep and stable geologic
32formations. This should be done in a manner that will enable author-
ities to retrieve the waste if reprocessing is implemented at some
future time but that will also allow the waste to remain where it is for
100,000 years without any need for maintainance. The most promising
site proposal is presently a salt formation near Carlsbad, New Mexico,
which appears to be extremely stable with extremely little chance of
groundwater ever penetrating the proposed burial point. With further
studies to make sure the site is safe from human intervention and with a
good governmental program for moving the waste to the site, we will soon
have a safe method of nuclear waste disposal.
The final major safety issue dealing with nuclear power is the fear
of proliferation or nuclear terrorism. Much literature has been written
on these subjects, the majority of which contains scary stories about
how someone could build a nuclear bomb in their basement using fuel
stolen from a nuclear power plant. However, although the schematic
design of a nuclear bomb is possible given enough access to information,
intelligence, and time, the building of a nuclear bomb is much more
difficult. Every nation that has developed nuclear weapons has devoted
the efforts of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians
ex-perienced in explosives, physics, and metallurgy and has had the
requisite financial resources and nuclear mateials. Also, the idea that
nuclear power plants even produce weapon grade material is just a popu-
lar myth. The U-235 produced during enrichment is much too dilute to
use in a bomb and the Pu-239 produced in the reacotr is too dilute and
much too radioactive to be handled. Only with the advent of reproces-
sing would Pu-239 be produced which could be used in a weapon.32 Pre-
sumably, commercial reprocessing plants would be protected to the same
degree as military ones are today, as even nuclear power plants are
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heavily guarded and protected from forced entry or any terrorist attacks
that might endanger the public. The proliferation of nuclear weapons.
through sales of nuclear power plant technology to foreign countries is
a much more complex worry to address. However, as long as reactors are
operated as they are meant to be, weapons grade fuel will not be pro-
duced. It would probably be much easier to obtain weapons grade mater-
ial elsewhere than to produce.it in a standard nuclear power plant.
Also, as long as plutonium separation and enrichment technology is not
exported by any country, the chance that a country which owns only a
nuclear power plant will develop the atomic bomb is small. In other
words, owning nuclear power plant technology is neither sufficient or
necessary for building a nuclear weapon.
While a more thorough discussion of each of these safety and health
issues is beyond the scope of this report, much literature has been
written on each issue. The main idea of this section is to point out
the various concerns that have been raised in opposition to nuclear
power and to try and dispel some of the myths that have been perpetrated
by anti-nuclear groups.
Political opposition to nuclear power
Because nuclear power is such a publicly contested issue today, it
is natural that political figures will often take a stance on the issue,
either for or against nuclear power. This can lead to problems for
nuclear power plant builders and operators in several different ways.
As was previously discussed, there are many different regulatory and
law-making bodies at many different governmental levels which have
something to say about nuclear power plant safey, siting, or desira-
bility. To complicate matters further, public officials are elected or
directors appointed several times during the building of a nuclear power
plant and many times over its operating life. For example, during the
twelve years of planning, designing, building, and testing of a nuclear
power plant, there may be 3 different presidents, 3 governors, 2 sena-
tors, and multiple changes in NRC commissioners, state and local board
commissioners, and even Supreme Court judges. The uncertainty caused by
this constant shift in political power can be quite troublesome to
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nuclear power plant builders and owners.
For example, President Jimmy Carter was opposed to nuclear power
development. During his term of office, there is convincing evidence
that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) was biased against nuclear
power. 41 At this time, the DOE, which is supposed to investigate all
energy alternatives to the best advantage of the American people, put
out mostly literature on renewable energy sources, and even went so far
as to destroy nuclear power information pamphlets left over from its
predecessor agencies. Furthermore, it was found that the DOE had pro-
vided active financial support through the Office of Consumer Affairs
(also strongly anti-nuclear at the time) to organizations actively
opposed to nuclear and other centralized power generation. Most con-
demning of all, by its policies on public information, the DOE was
preventing the development and implementation of policies that would
assure adequate supplies of energy in the future. Much of the public
opposition to nuclear power occurred at this time, as the public looked
at supposedly responsible agencies that were actively opposed to nuclear
power.
As a counter example, the current Reagan administration favors the
development of nuclear power.22 They are taking steps to increase the
speed and efficiency with which the NRC deals with licensing, and are
pushing the NRC to help develop standardized procedures and to have a
fixed safety goal for which nuclear power plants should be designed.
It is obvious that political powers can have a profound effect upon
the attractiveness of nuclear power for development.25 Thus, the uncer-
tainty over multiple elections and appointments during the lifetime of a
nuclear project is a just cause for nuclear power plant owners and
operators to be concerned with and to try to influence if possible.
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CHAPTER 4 -- WPPSS CASE
WPPSS History and Organization3
Although the Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS) offi-
cially began in the late 1950s, we need to go back to the 1880s to trace
how it came into being.
In 1882, the territory of Washington got its first electric gener-
ator through the Tacoma Mill Company, which installed the generator to
provide lights for its mill and yards. By 1891, Ellensburg City Light
was created as the first municiple electric utility in the state, with
Seattle and Tacoma soon to follow suit. Soon after, the Washington
State Grange leaders began to study these municiple electric systems and
decided to adapt them to county-wide systems called Public Utility
Districts (PUDS) in order to bring electricity to rural regions of the
state. Initiative #1, adopted by residents in 1927, was a new law which
stated that local people could initiate action to form PUDS. Between
1932 and 1940, a total of 32 PUDS in counties were formed. The PUDS are
governed by locally-elected commissioners, rather than being under the
jurisdiction of the state utility commission as private utilites are.
The majority of these public utilities purchase their entire power
supply from the federal hydro-electric system through the Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA). The PUDS are often called "preferred custo-
mers" because they were given first preference for that federal power.
By the early 1950s, many PUD commissioners forsaw a time when the
federal hydro resources would be inadequate to meet the growing needs of
their customers, and they began seeking legislation which would allow
some PUDS to pool their limited resources to build new power plants. In
1957, the Washington Legislature passed the Joint Operating Agency law
which allowed the seventeen interested PUDS to form a single agency--the
WPPSS--to build and operate generating facilities. WPPSS is not a
utility--it does not set rates nor forecast power needs. Each member
PUD has one representative on the WPPSS board of directors. The origi-
nal rules also provided for an Executive Committee to take action
between board meetings, but this committee has since been replaced by an
Executive Board made up of both public utility and outside
-44-
representatives.
In 1962, the Board approved the first WPPSS project at Packwood
Lake, about 20 miles southeast of Mt. Ranier. The hydroelectric pro-
ject, which began operation in 1964, was financed by bond sales totaling
$13.7 million. The project was very successful, since it is expected to
produce more than $60 million in revenue over its lifetime and has
already produced more than 2 billion kilowatt hours of electricity.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Board also explored the
p6ssibility of generating electricity using byproduct steam from the
federal defense products plutonium reactor at Hanford. The AEC had
suggested the idea of generating power with a dual-purpose reactor at
Hanford, but Congress turned them down for funding. WPPSS decided to
fund the project itself, and drew up its own proposal. In September
1962, a bill was passed that authorized the AEC to sell waste steam to
WPPSS. The Hanford Generating Project cost only $122 M to build, and
was completed in less than 4 years. At the time, the 860-MW
HGP/N-Reactor complex was the largest civilian power plant in the U.S.,
and it has produced over 50 billion Kw Hours of electricity to date.
In the 1960s the Joint Power Planning Council (JPPC) was formed,
made up of the region's public and private utilities, in order to plan
new ways to provide power for the growing northwest region. Most of the
power generated previously had come from hydroelectric projects in the
region, but environmentally acceptable sites for dams had all but run
out by the 1960s. Thus, any future additions to the power base would
have to come from thermal power plants, either nuclear, coal, or oil.
After extensive study and negotiation, the JPPC decided upon construct-
ing 19 new large generating units in 1968. Nuclear power, they decided,
had a considerable cost advantage in the Northwest, followed by mine-
mouth coal plants. Three of the 19 recommend plants were nuclear, and
WPPSS was looked upon as a logical choice for constructing these 3
plants, since the Supply System had successfully completed the Packwood
Dam and the Hanford reactor projects. WNP-1 and -2 were to be built at
Hanford and WNP-3 at Satsop. Some of the cost of building these plants
was to be melded into the BPA rate base.
Despite the addition of these planned power plants, energy forecasts
around 1970 continued to predict deficits in the 1980s and the hydro-
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thermal plan was revised to include more generating units. (In the
1960s electrical use in the Northwest was growing at about 7% per year,
and it was projected to continue growing at 5% per year in the 1970s.)
At this time utility managers throughout the Northwest were bombarded
with warnings of impending power shortages from a host of respected
power authorities. Public utility planners soon began to develop con-
struction plans for two additional nuclear projects that would be loca-
ted at the sQme construction sites as WNP-1 and -3 and would be their
twins, in order to take advantage of the economies of dual-unit
construction.
Thus, by January 1975, the necessary agreements for WNP-4 and -5 had
been drafted. Public hearings throughout the region were held as vari-
ous power authorities decided whether or not to participate. Many were
pushed to a "yes" decision by forecasts of shortages by well-respected
power authorities such as the Public Power Council and even the BPA.
The BPA actually sent a notice to its customers saying that after 1983
they would have insufficient power to meet the increased needs of even
their preference customers. By July 1976, 88 public-owned utilities
signed agreements for participation in WNP-4 and -5, purchasing all of
the capability of WNP-4 and 90% of WNP-5. A private utility, Pacific
Power and Light Co., bought the other 10% of WNP-5.
Construction responsibility for WNP-4 and -5 was given to WPPSS.
However, the interests of the 88 participants were represented by a
seven-member Participants Committee with each member entitled to a vote
equal to the ownership shares of the utilities he represents. The
Committee met every other week to discuss and vote on such matters as
the awarding or revision of contracts, construction budgets, and pro-
posed bond resolutions.
Supply System Financing60 961
WPPSS's power generating plants are largely financed by borrowing
money secured through a legally binding commitment by its participating
utilities to repay the debt from their future sales of electric power,
even if these plants are not completed. This type of contract to repay
debts no matter what happens to the project is often referred to as a
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"come hell or high water" contract. All WPPSS construction projects
have been financed in this manner.
The Supply System generally sells long-term, tax-exempt municiple
revenue bonds through investment brokerage houses to investors such as
banks, insurance companies, and, increasingly, to individuals.
Individuals buy bonds from municiple corporations such as WPPSS because
of their tax exempt status and because, .traditionally, they have been
extremely safe investments. Because interest rates on these bonds have
historically been low, this can result in a savings to electric power
consumers. Although recent interest rates on WPPSS bonds are higher,
the overall average interest rates on all Supply System bonds to date is
9.23%. So far, over $7 billion has been raised in this manner to build
the nuclear plant projects. This investment represents the second
largest capital formation project in the U.S., the largest being the
Tennessee Valley Authority which has access to capital from the Federal
Financing Bank.
As mentioned previously, municiple bonds from agencies such as WPPSS
have always been considered safe, and the WNP bonds are no exception.
Projects 1-3 have always had the top notch AAA rating from Standard and
Poor's Corporation and the only slightly lower Aa rating from Moody's
Investors Service, Inc. WNP-4 and -5 enjoyed A+ ratings until the onset
of a temination crisis in 1981 when the ratings were reduced to Baa by
Standard and Poor's and suspended by Moody's.
Projects 1-3 have higher ratings because they are backed by a larger
number of utilities through the BPA. The sale of power from these units
is underwritten by the federal BPA through net-billing agreements.
Under net-billing, the utility participants agree to buy the power
capability of 'the WPPSS plants and in turn assign that capability *to the
BPA. The BPA pays the participant's financial obligation for building
the plants from its entire pool of revenue, including the large amount
of revenue from low-cost hydro projects and non-preference customers.
This reduces the cost of power to the individual consumer because the
higher cost thermal power has been melded with low-cost hydro power and
lends additional security to bonds. The bonds are backed by a federal
agency's unconditional promise to repay the loans and by a revenue base
that is considerably larger than all of the WPPSS participants put
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together. Net-billing was first applied to the Trojan nuclear plant in
Oregon and later to WNP-1, -2, and -3. However, before net-billing
contracts could be written for WNP-4 and -5, the Internal Revenue
Service ruled that BPA-backed bonds no longer qualified for tax exemp-
tion. Rather than lose the tax exemption, the primary attraction of
municiple bonds, the participants in WNP-4 and -5 decided to forego the
advantage of net-billing.
The major elements behind the security of bonds for WNP-4 and -5
are; the "hell-or-high-water" promise to pay made by the participants,
the promise of participants to raise rates sufficient to repay the debt,
and the promise of the participants to pay defaulting shares, up to a
maximum additional amount of 25% of their own original shares. With the
termination of WNP-4 and -5, some of the participants have been trying
to put the "hell-or-high-water" clause to a legal test. 38
Although attorneys had been of the opinion that the contracts were
unbreakable, a very recent event has caused alarm and controversy
throughout the Northwest. At the beginning of October 1982, an Oregon
circuit court judge ruled that eleven Oregon municiple utilities had no
legal right to participate in the projects and thus bear no responsi-
bility for paying their share of the outstanding debt. 9
It is worth mentioning here the historical and recent interest rates
WPPSS has had to pay on its bonds, and to discuss how bond sales are
accomplished. Until the late 1970s, WPPSS was able to sell bonds at
interest rates of 7% or less. Around 1978, rates began to rise stead-
ily, with the most recent issues selling at about 14 to 15%. When
interest rates were low, WPPSS had no trouble selling bonds through its
only legal avenue--a competitive bidding process. That means it adver-
tised an issue, usually in the $200 milliion range, and invited broker-
age firms to submit bids. The firm that submitted the lowest interest
cost was awarded the bonds. In the late 1970s, however, along with the
increase in interest rates came a trend toward single bids for WPPSS
bonds, especially for WNP-4 and -5 bonds. WPPSS also found itself
competing in the municiple bond market with an increasing number of
other joint-operating-agencies and was at a disadvantage because the
other JOAs did not require competitive bids, and generally, had much
smaller financing programs. So, in 1981 the Washington Legislature
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approved a WPPSS request for marketing bonds by the method known as
"negotiated financing". This law allows WPPSS greater flexibility in-
fixing the time of its bond sales and the amount. New bond sales have
been in the range of $800 million, the last being on May 1, 1982 for
units 2 and 3 only for $680 million at about 13 1/2% interest.
That May 1 date for the last bond issure is significant, since on
July 1, 1982 the newly passed Initiative 394 was to go into effect.
This Initiative, passed in November 1981, is called the Energy Financing
Approval Act and was aimed specifically at WPPSS's huge cost overruns on
its projects. The law requires elections before public agencies in
Washington can issue bonds to finance electrical generating stations of
more than 250 MWe, or before they can issue bonds on projects that are
200% over their initial budget and have to raise more than $200 million
to complete. Although local editorial opinion has been strongly in
favor of passing all such WPPSS bond issues, the question has worried
many officials who fear that the state might be left with mostly com-
plete nuclear power plants and a large debt, but no power. In December
1981, three bond fund trustees filed a lawsuit on behalf of the bond-
holders claiming 1-394 is unconstitutional. Briefly, their lawyers
argued that 1-394 impairs an existing contract that these bondholders
have with WPPSS. If a future bond issue were to lose in an election,
that might mean that the plants would not be built and might not be able
to generate the electricity to pay the bondholders back. In the Summer
of 1982, a Washington circuit judge did, in fact, find 1-394 unconstitu-
tional, for the above reasons. The decision is on appeal, however.
Northwest Electrical Rates
The cost of electricity in the Northwest has traditionally been low,
and is still today the lowest in the country. This is true because
Northwest utilities have been able to draw on the low cost power,
through the BPA, of federal hydroelectric projects along the Columbia
River System. Residents have also benefited from the success of the
public power movement, since the PUDs have preferred access to low-cost
power and do not have to.pay corporate income taxes or dividends to
stockholders. Thus, for more than 30 years most PUD rates were essent-
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ially at or below 1946 prices. For example, Benton County residents
paid about 1.6 cents per kilowatt hour in 1980, which is about the same
as what they paid in 1946.31 For most of this time, in fact, rates were
below 1946 levels. Only in the 1970s did rates begin to climb. This
extremely low historical cost for power is now forcing the raising of at
least two major issues. First, ratepayers are now concerned about how
much their rates have been going up recently as a result of the building
of WNP-1-5. Second, public officials have begun to stress the need for
conservation of electricity, which is causing problems with new project-
ions of demand and with decisions on whether or not to build power
plants.
Rates have been going up rapidly since 1980 in the Northwest in
large part because ratepayers are now beginning to pay interest during
construction (IDC) on WPPSS's net-billed plants (WNP-1,2 and after
September 1982 on WNP-3) before they are in operation and producing
revenue from electricity sales. This situation came into being because
the net-billing agreements with BPA specified that payment would begin
at a "date certain" which was the date the plants were originally sched-
uled to go into operation. BPA has announced it will have to raise its
wholesale rates as much as 80% by October, 1982. 75% of this increase
is due to interest payments for WNP-1, -2, and -3. While rates have
been going up rapidly, the rise in rates should begin to taper off and
reach a plateau as the plants come on line and begin producing power.
The base price of electricity from WNP-2 in 1984 will be 6.2 cents/KwHr
and from WNP-3 in 1987 will be 9 cents/KwHr. Although these prices are
high compared with electricity from federal dams, they are still lower
than prices from other new generating sources such as coal plants.
Termination of Projects 4/5 is aggrevating.the situation for the 88
participating utilities since it is pushing additional costs onto con-
sumers much sooner than they would have had to pay if the plants were
completed. The total debt is about $2.25 billion, and after interest
for 30 years, will amount to about $7 billion total payments.15 The
rate increases to customers of these utilities will range from 0.15
cents/KwHr (or $2/month for the average residential customer) to 1.8
cents/KwHr (or $24/month .for the customer).64 Solutions to this problem
from the utilities have been varied. Some have simply decided to
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default, some are trying to get federal 7% loans, some are going to
court to be released from their debt legally (as mentioned earlier), and
some have simply decided to pay. Although ratepayers are understandably
upset about these increases, local editorial opinion is that the utili-
ties should pay off their debt, no matter how painful, or try and find
other ways to ease the situation for those unable to pay. Otherwise,
opinion states, no other municiple bonds will be able to be sold in the
Northwest for years, with investors worried about losing their invest-
64
ment. Despite these warnings, most of the 88 utilities are attempting
some means to get out of repaying their debt. As yet the final count of
defaulters and their impact on the bonds and on the borrowing capability
of other Northwest agencies has not been fully resolved. It will be
interesting to watch how this situation develops and what are the
results.
The abundant supply of inexpensive hydropower in the Northwest has
not only given the region the highest electricity cons'm(tion rate in the
nation, but has also worked against implementation of conservation
measures. As a result, the Pacific Northwest Electrical Power Planning
and Conservation Act was enacted in December 1980 by the U. S. Congress.
The Act directs the region to rely as much as possible on cost-effective
conservation and renewable energy resources in meeting its electrical
needs. BPA is responsible for carrying out the plan by acquiring needed
electric resources, giving an automatic 10% cost advantage to conserva-
tion programs over new generation programs. These newly implemented
conservation programs coupled with rising rates since the early 1970s
have played havoc with electric demand forecasts in the Northwest and
are still making it extremely difficult to forecast future demand.
Problems caused by this uncertianty will be discussed later in this
report, but short-term effects are worth discussing here. Expensive new
resources and conservation programs can cause short-term downfalls in
utility revenues. A utility may experience a revenue shortfall if it
implements an expensive conservation program that reduces sales. If the
utility raises rates to cover that program, consumers may respond by
reducing demand even more than anticipated, causing another revenue
shortfall. Now the utility must be careful in considering whether to
raise rates again to cover the shortfall, since another raise in rates
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might cause consumers to reduce demand even further and to complain that
they are being penalized for conserving. Although price-demand
responses tend to stabilize after a point, handling these issues can be
difficult and unpopular.
WPPSS Nuclear Power Plant General Information
Having already provided a history and background of WPPSS, i.t will
be useful at this point to allow reference to several fact sheets on the
five new nuclear projects which WPPSS is managing. These lists should
prove useful both for general infromation purposes and as reference
material for the next section of this paper dealing with problems WPPSS
has faced over the lifetimes of these projects.59
FACT SHEET
GENERAL INFORMATION (WPPSS -i rures)
WNP 1
Location:
Capacity:
Reactor
Hanford
1250 MWe
Babcock &
Wllcox
United
Engineers
Archlte
Enginee
WNP 2
Hanford
1100MWe
General
Electric
Burns and
Roe
WNP 3
Satsop
1240MWe
Combustion
Engineering
Ebasco
WNP 4
Hanford
1250 MWe
Babcock
and Wilcox
United
Engineers
WNP 5
Satsop
1240 MWe
Combustion
Engineering
Ebasco
Construction
Manager
Private utility
participation
No. of public
utility participants
Bechtel
0
BechtelBechtel
0
94
EbascoEbasco
30%
103104
0
88
10%
88
FACT SHEET
COSTS AND SCHEDULES
(figures in $ billions)
WNP-2 WNP-3
(WT1PPSS Fi••,ires)
WNP-4
First Official
estimate
1982 Budget
1983 Budget
First Estimate
of Commercial
Operation
Current Dstimate
of Commercial
Operation
Percent Complete
(September 1982)
Bond Rating
Current Debt
9/80
Deferred
63
AAA
2.1
9/77
2/84
92
AAA
2.37
9/81 3/82 3/83
12/86
60
AAA
1.6
22.1 13.0
Moody's ----- Suspended-----
S & P Baa Baa
2.25 for 4/5 combined
.15 .96
WNP-1
$1.2
4.3
4.3
.5
3.2
3.2
1.4
4.6
4.9
WNP-5
1.6 1.9
Financing to go:
MILESTONE DATES
WNP-2 WNP-1 WNP-3 WNP-4 WNP-5
(Projects Terminated 1-'82)
Issuance of Site
Certificate by State 5-72 8-75 10-76 8-75 10-76
Date Construction Permit
Granted by AEC (WNP-2)
or NRC 3-73 12-23-75 4-11-78 2-21-78 4-11-78
Date Net-billing
Agreements
Signed with BPA 1-4-71 2-6-73 9-25-73 NA NA
Original Date for
Commercial Operation 9-77 9-80 9-81 3-82 3-83
Application Date
for Operating License
with NRC 6-78 11-25-81 6-82 -
(WPSPS Figures)
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Timetable of Important Events
1971
1972
1973
1974
1978 August
1980 June
November
1981 May 29
June 18
June
October
Nov. 3
December
1982 Jan. 22
April
April 29
May I
July I
July
September
October 1
WNP-2 NSSS contract awarded to General Electric.
WNP-1 NSSS contract awarded to Babcock and Wilcox.
WNP-3 NSSS contract awarded to Combustion
Engineering.
WNP-4 NSSS contract awarded to Babcock and Wilcox
and WNP-5 to Combustion Engineering.
BPA hires Theodore Barry to assess roles of BPA and
WPPSS on WNP-1,-2,-3.
Strike at Hanford site stops work on WNP-I,-2,-4.
Hanford strike ends.
WPPSS Director calls for temporary halt on WNP-4 and
-5.
Board of Directors approves temporary halt.
Bechtel hired as construction manager for WNP-2.
Bechtel hired as systems completion contractor on
WNP-2
Iniative 394 passed by voters.
Tousch-Ross hired to study disbanding of WNP-4 and
-5.
WNP-4 and -5 formally terminated.
BPA recommends that WNP-1 be delayed.
WPPSS approves delay on WNP-1.
$800 M bond issue for WNP-2 and -3.
Initiative 394 goes into effect.
Ebasco gets full construction management role on
WNP-3. Iniative 394 found unconstitutional.
Utilities hire Shearson-American Express to try to
get federal loans for paying debt on WNP-4 and
-5.
Oregon utilities are relieved of obligation to pay
their share of WNP-4 and -5 by circuit court
judge.
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WPPSS Nuclear Power Plant Problems and Relation to Industry
1. Technological Problems
WPPSS is having the same type of technological problems as the rest
of the nuclear industry.3 1 Both NRC and A/E initiated design changes
have been frequent and costly, and there is evidence that the A/Es have
not taken into account the risk costs of making design changes. WPPSS
estimates that about 50% of their total cost overrun is due to changed
regulatory requirements. Although that figure includes all costs such
as increases in materials needed and delays causing higher interest
costs, much of the 50% can be charged to NRC initiated design changes.
As just one example, in 1977 the NRC issued new criteria for strength-
ening the containment walls because of a vibration problem noted in
operating BWRs. To implement this strengthening in WNP-2, it was
decided that more steel had to be installed in the wetwell, a structure
that makes up the lower portion of the containment. However, by 1977,
WNP-2's wetwell was completed and enclosed with only a small opening,
too small for a man to walk through. Yet large steel beams had to be
manhandled through this opening and installed in the wetwell at great
cost in time and money.
An example of an A/E initiated design change has already been dis-
cussed, but it is worth mentioning here.44 On October 1, 1975 a meeting
was held between Ebasco representatives, WPPSS managers, and some NRC
staff members to discuss Ebasco-proposed design changes. There were 25
design changes recommended by Ebasco which were calculated to result in
a savings of $87 million on WNP-3 and $105 million on WNP-5. These
changes included eliminating some access roads, relocation of barge
docks, transformer yard, and steam lines, and reducing rebar ratios.
Ebasco had come to the conclusion and reported to WPPSS that these
changes should result in no NRC delays in approving the two plant's
SERs. In fact, however, the NRC advised WPPSS that their proposed
changes would certainly impact the safety review schedule - at least by
three months. Thus, it can be seen that Ebasco has not properly consi-
dered the cost of delay by the NRC in making its design change propo-
sals. Although these changes would save in the neighborhood of $90
million per plant, that savings would be wiped out by even the minimum
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delay of three months. Again, there is the chance that the NRC may
disapprove some of these changes, thus the savings will disappear and
the redesign costs will have been wasted. Although the construction
permit for WNP-3 and -5 was expected at this time to be issued by the
NRC on 3/8/76, it was actually not issued until 4/11/78, a delay of over
two years, due in part to A/E initiated design changes.
Although it remains to be seen how many operating incidents these
plants will have, it is very fair to speculate that small reportable
incidents will be happening about as often as they do in currently
operating plants. Most of the technology in these plants is twelve
years old, despite all the design changes. For example a plant started
in 1967 and starting operation in 1973, such as Zion 1,2 has only four
less years of possible design advances than a plant such as WNP-2,
started in 1971 and coming on line in 1984. Due to increasing schedule
times, newer plants do not have proportionally newer technology
incorporated into them.
2. Resources
a. Capital
As with all large constuction projects started in the early 1970s,
WPPSS nuclear power plants suffered huge cost increases due to unantici-
pated rised in inflation and interest rates. As mentioned earlier, the
average annual inflation rate during the 1960s and until 1973 was about
3%. It is understandable, then, that the average annual increase of
10.3% during the rest of the 1970s and early 1980s was unanticipated in
the original estimate of cost. Total increased costs due to inflation
have been estimated by WPPSS to include about 25% of the total cost
overruns for WNP-1 through -5. Although interest rates had been rising
steadily in the 1970s, WPPSS did not begin to feel their true effects
until around 1980. For years, WPPSS borrowed money at the relatively
low rate of 6 to 7 percent. Beginning in 1980, however, interest rates
began to shoot up rapidly to the 15% range, thus becoming in the last
couple of years one of the major factors in influencing cost overruns.
Interest rates are already figured into the 50% of overrun cost due to
NRC requirements causing.schedule delays but at least an additional 5%
of the overruns are due to increases in rates for the last two years
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independent of additional delays.
Figure 4.1 shows the breakdown of costs by WNP-1, -2, and -3.59 As
can be seen, interest costs are 30% for WNP-1 (without the delay in con-
struction now proposed to cost about $1 billion/year-delayed, about
half due to interest and 1/4 due to inflation), 25% for WNP-2, and 30%
for WNP-3.
b. Workforce
WPPSS bas had more than its share of labor-related problems during
construction of its nuclear power plants. Labor demand was initially
underestimated and resulted in shortages of some critical skills as well
as adverse effects on the small communities around Satsop. The number
of workers who are at least occasionally on the site is about 4000-5000
per reactor. This peak workforce is not only about three times as large
as originally predicted, but has also been needed for several more years
than was predicted. Of course, that fact alone increased estimated
costs for building the plants. In western Washington, near the small
town of Satsop where WNP-3 and -5 were being built (WNP-5 is now termi-
nated), adverse social effects of bringing in over 8000 workers were
being felt. Many of the boomtown effects discussed earlier, such as
problems with city services like police, water, and education, developed
to a severe degree in and around Satsop. Although WPPSS gave financial
aid to these small communities, a certain amount of resentment has grown
up toward the people responsible for the "changes" in the communities.
The only effect near the Hanford site, which is near Richland,
Washington, was a rather severe traffic problem on the roads leading to
the site as 10,000 or so workers tried to make their way there each
day.31
The other major labor problem faced by WPPSS was the six-month
strike at the 3 Hanford plants. Although the strike of 1978 cost an
estimated $1 million/day/plant,31 there was nothing WPPSS could do to
stop it because of the way their contracts were written. Since WPPSS is
a public agency, it had to take bids on any work greater than $5000 and
award the work to the lowest bidder. This resulted in a huge number of
contractors being hired, each of which had his own contract with his own
labor. Because of the way these contracts were written, it was illegal
for WPPSS to interfere. These strikes and their resulting schedule
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extensions account for about 15% of the total cost overruns. The dis-
pute arose when the unions refused to negotiate on terms set by the
newly formed Hanford Contractors Association, but later, wages became an
issue. In the final settlement, workers were awarded higher wages and
the Hanford Contractors Association became the negotiating body for all
the unions for a period of five years.9
3. Materials
Materials experienced large cost increases during the construction
of the WNP plants. As was discussed earlier, some materials' cost rose
as much as 300% over the period of the 1970s. For a specific WPPSS
example, in 1976 a 100-weight steel reinforcing bar cost $16.65; in 1980
the same steel cost $25.10, representing a 60% increase in only four
63
years. At the same time, because of changing regulations, there was a
giant leap in the amount of such steel that went into the nuclear power
plants.
Another problem with materials experienced by WPPSS was with the
efficient handling of materials on the site. Due to the large number of
contractors involved before 1981, there were a number of disputes and
difficulties about who had priority in different areas of the plant at
different times (as discussed under the general section on materials).
Since WPPSS was granted their request for adoption of a state law allow-
ing WPPSS to negotiate with a single completion contractor for projects
more than 80% complete, this problem has disappeared, at least on
WNP-2/37
Management Competence
1. Industry level and the NRC
As stated earlier, WPPSS blames changed regulatory requirements for
50% of their cost overruns. This figure includes costs due to schedule
delays, material increases due to inflation and increases in required
quantities, increased labor needed, and other related costs.
At WPPSS, amounts of materials needed changed greatly since the
estimates at the beginning of the project. For example, the approxi-
mately 5000 tons of steel and 80,000 cubic yards of concrete estimated
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to be needed for each reactor at the beginning of the projects in the
early 1970s has increased to 11,000 tons of steel and 200,000 cubic
yards of concrete.
A particular problem at WNP-2 was the NRC mandated work stoppage on
113
safety related systems in July 1980 due to quality concerns. The NRC
imposed a $59,000 fine on WPPSS because of work which did not meet its
standards. The problems included faulty documentation and faulty welds
and concrete work on the sacrificial shield wall, the thick concrete-
and-steel structure built around the reactor to protect workers in the
plant. Between the labor dispute which began in May 1980 and the work
stoppage on safety related systems in July 1980, the craft work force on
the site was reduced by 90% during the latter half of that year. Thus,
the problems causing the work stoppage were not corrected until May
1981. On May 31, 1981, the NRC and WPPSS agreed to restart work on
safety-related systems at WNP-2. It was a long and painstaking process
to prepare to restart the eight contractors affected by the work
stoppage. Almost 700 procedures had to be reviewed and revised, a
process which took about 100 man-years.
2. Firm level
WPPSS, as previously discussed, is a firm made up of public utili-
ties. WPPSS had built the Packwood Dam and the Hanford Generating
Project, and thus it was unlike some public utilities which had no
experience in building or operating their own power plants. However,
these were relatively small projects compared with attempting to build
simultaneously five nuclear power plants with almost 6000 Mw total
generating capacity. WPPSS had fewer than 100 employers when it under-
took building three nuclear power plants. Most of the staff was associ-
ated with the operation of Packwood or the Hanford Project. There was
no consistent management system or approach for the total Supply System.
Managerial changes in key positions were frequent so that there was
little continuity in philosophy or policies for any of the projects.31
This was compounded by the fact that there were three different A/E
firms working on the projects using three different designs and NSSS
suppliers. As mentioned earlier, the confusing number of contractors
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was caused because WPPSS is a public joint operating agency and comes
under laws which restrict financing and contracting procedures - both.
required competitive bidding. While adherence to the principle of
competitive bid and awarding contracts to the lowest bidder works well
in many construction projects, it was not tailored to building nuclear
power plants. In the case of WPPSS projects, rigid interpretation of
the law resulted in over 100 prime contractors for the five projects.
The multitude of contractors added to the complexity of the construction
control program and individual accountability was difficult to deter-
mine. WPPSS's early management and Boards vested significant authority
with the A/Es and construction managers (largely because WPPSS managers
were inexperienced and scared to handle the projects), leaving the
Supply System with very minimal control and overview. In addition, the
projects were not managed against a total baseline budget and schedule,
but by individual contracts. Contracting was the only vehicle for
accomplishing work.
The nature of a joint operating agency makes its management system
extremely complex. Responsibilities are vested with a board of direc-
tors, and WPPSS is accountable to many outside agencies. These agencies
include consumer, state, and federal authorities, and are summarized in
Figure 4.2.63
3. Project level
As discussed in the general section of this report, project control
is difficult if not impossible when a large number of contractors are
trying to work on the same project. WPPSS has experienced problems due
to th~eir large number of contractors. Jurisdictional and interface
complaints, inefficiency, poor quality control, and poor documentation
have all been big problems for WPPSS. As soon as Bechtel, with their
experienced and sophisticated PM techniques, was able to take over,
these problems dissappeared and the projects were turned around.
A problem of not being able to hire a project manager to oversee
each project has been that WPPSS was not kept informed of schedule
delays and cost overruns, and, more importantly, was not able to deter-
mine and correct any of the causes of these problems. This was demon-
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strated most strikingly in 1980 when Robert Ferguson took over as
Managing Director of WPPSS and ordered a comprehensive and realistic
appraisal of costs and times to completion. He found that the projects'
realistic cost estimate should be about $8 billion higher than it
currently was.
SUMMARY OF SUPPLY SIDE PROBLEMS
The estimated costs of the five WPPSS nuclear power plants have
risen from the first official estimates of about $6 billion to an April
1981 estimate of $23.9 billion (if all five projects were to be com-
pleted). See Figure 4.3 for a graphical illustration of increased cost
estimations over the years. The approximate summary of the reasons for
these cost overruns is listed below.31'63
Changed regulatory requirements 50%
Strikes 15%
Inflation 25%
Interest increases since 1980 5%
Nuclear fuel 4%
Other authorized costs 1%
Changed regulatory requirements include the cost of additional
materials, labor and design necessitated and also the costs of delay.
On the average, every month of delay adds $30 million per plant due to
interest on debt, overhead, and other costs. See Figure 4.4 for an
illustration of increased time to completion estimations over the years.
These delay costs are the major component of costs due to strikes.
Inflation and interest rates are calculated as those costs above those
initially estimated due to inflation and interest rates (interest rates
were not significantly above predicted rates until 1980). Nuclear fuel
costs have also increased slightly faster than expected; the fuel
increase would have caused a much larger increase for coal or oil
plants.
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DEMAND SIDE PROBLEMS AT WPPSS
By far the major demand side problems at WPPSS has been a huge
decrease in forecast demand. In the early 1970s, electrical usage in
the Northwest was predicted to grow at about 5% per year during the
1970s. This seemed like a reasonable number at the time, since the
growth rate during the 1960s was about 7% per year. Power deficits were
being predicted for the 1980s from 1968 until at least 1978!3 The
first three nuclear power plants for WPPSS were part of the 1968 Hydro-
Thermal Power Program proposed by the Joint Power Planning Council. But
even with these three plants and others scheduled in the Hydro-Thermal
Plan, all of the respected Northwest power authorities were still pre-
dicting power shortages by the 1980s. Thus, in 1974, it was decided
that WPPSS should take on the responsibility of two more nuclear power
plants, warning that even with this capacity power shortages would occur
by 1985 in years of low rainfall. Respected authorities urging building
of new capacity included the Public Power Council, which represents the
power supply and planning interests of the region's publicly owned
utilities, and the BPA, which issued notices that it would be unable to
supply its preference customers' increased needs by 1983 if all five
nuclear power plants were not built.
By 1981, the BPA was still predicting a 3% average annual demand
growth until the year 2000 for the Pacific Northwest. But in July 1982,
the BPA released its new prediction of only 1.6% annual growth, and
announced that large surpluses, of about 900 Mw capacity, will occur by
1985.61 These surpluses will occur even though only two of the nuclear
plants will be operating and many of the originally planned power plants
were never built. Higher electripity prices, reduced industrial demand,
conservation, and other factors are responsible for the decreased demand
according to the BPA. Shortages are still being predicted for the mid-
1990s by the BPA, and many proponents believe that at least one of the
cancelled WNP plants will be needed to avoid shortages in that year.
WPPSS has been fortunate in that it has not had to contend with much
public or political opposition to its nuclear power plants on safety,
health, or environmental issues. There was no delay-causing public
intervention in the licensing process, and no organized political oppo-
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sition to the projects. There were a few vocal opponents to the two
projects near Satsop, but this opposition was almost exclusively one
which was opposed to growth and change of any kind in the undeveloped
areas around Satsop. Most opponents were not anti-nuclear, they were
simply anti-growth, and many were most upset about the short term prob-
lems in their communities due to the large influx of construction
workers. The absense of anti-nuclear oppostiion in the areas may be due
in part to the fact that the people have been living near the U.S.
government's plutonium reactor at Hanford for a long time without inci-
dent. Even though this is an old reactor and is producing weapons grade
material and even though about 80% of all the U.S. goverment's nuclear
waste is stored there, there has never been any public scare over the
safety of living near such a site. Thus, these new and modern, compari-
tively clean and safe reactors must seem incredibly safe when compared
with the government project at Hanford. Also, people have been accus-
tomed to receiving inexpensive power from the Hanford Generating
Project, and, until recently, believed that power from these new nuclear
power plants would also be quite cheap and was needed very badly to
avoid shortages in the near future. With recent revelations of huge
cost overruns and impending surpluses of electrical supply, many people
have become understandably opposed to the projects on financial and
practical grounds. As the public saw their electricity bills rising,
they began to ask more questions, and as the answers became apparent,
Initiative 394 was passed. Even though responsible local editorial
opinion would urge people never to reject a bond issue (or else they
will get no power and have to pay the debt already incurred anyway), the
Initiative was passed because the people were angry at WPPSS for having
so much trouble with their nuclear power plants. Because 1-394 was '
found unconstitutional (although that decision is under appeal), even
this bit of public opposition should give WPPSS no trouble.
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CHAPTER 5 -- DECISIONS TO CLOSE THREE PLANTS
WNP 4/5
As mentioned previously, Robert L. Ferguson was hired as Managing
Director of WPPSS in August 1980. He was chosen for his impressive past
experience in nuclear projects, and at the time he was hired, WPPSS had
many problems. Work was shut down at Hanford due to strikes and NRC
questions about quality, and all the projects were years behind schedule
and billions over budget.
One of the first things Ferguson did upon taking office was to
institute a reorganization of WPPSS management. A new and extremely
experienced team of director-level managers was recruited from the
nuclear and construction industries. Each is assigned to a construction
site: Project 2, Projects 1/4, or Projects 3/5. This new decentrlaized
approach makes each program director accountable for performance against
a baseline budget and schedule. A special independent engineering task
force of five nationally known executive engineers was appoited to make
a comprehensive evaluation of construction management at the Supply
System. As a result of its recommendations, WPPSS ended the practice of
integrated management with their construction managers and clarified the
roles for interaction of WPPSS, the A/Es, and the construction managers.
In January 1981, WPPSS delegated construction management to national
experts in the nuclear field. The Bechtel Power Corporation, which has
built over 35% of this country's nuclear capacity, assumed management of
construction and pre-startup activities for the three projects at
Hanford. EBASCO was given undivided responsibility for construction
management at Projects 3 and 5 at Satsop. Contracting activities were
centralized under a single director to assure greater consistency in
contracting, and selected contracts at all of the projects were
realigned to streamline the total number of contractors and to provide
incentives to complete the job on schedule. As mentioned earlier, WPPSS
also gained the freedom to select a completion contractor based on their
ability to perform rather than a competitive bid when a project is more
than 80% complete. Thus, in August 1981, Bechtel was selected as the
completion contractor for WNP-2.
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Efforts were made to improve labor relations on the projects, and
they did improve. In February 1981, a labor stabilization agreement was
signed at Satsop which precluded a site shutdown during a labor dispute
at WNP 3/5. The five-and-a-half month dispute was resolved at Hanford,
and a labor stabilization agreement was also signed there.
In April 1981 the NRC conducted an extensive audit of work at the
WPPSS projects. Afterwards, it, commended WPPSS for its "commitment to
quality" and gave the go-ahead to resume safety-related work at WNP-2.
That audit satisfied new NRC regulations instituted after the TMI
incident.
Finally, as things had turned around for the better and construction
of the plants was moving along very well, Mr. Ferguson decided to estab-
lish integrated engineering and construction schedules and to research a
realistic budget for the projects. The five-month estimating process
began in January 1981 and involved hundreds of WPPSS, constuction mana-
ger, and contractor employees. It was the most thorough estimating
effort ever undertaken at WPPSS (or probably anywhere else), and was
based on historical data from WPPSS's own projects as well as pertinent
information from other U.S. and foreign generating projects. Actual
quantities of materials specified on engineering drawings and instal-
lation rates derived from historical data were calculated. Existing
contracts were reviewed; upcoming contracts were analyzed and projected
into the budget. Wall Street was constulted for advice on probable
interest rates, and realistic assumptions for inflation and interest
were incorporated into the estimate. The results were given to Ferguson
in May 1981. When he first heard the preliminary results he could
hardly believe them and sent his analysts back to check their numbers,
but the figures stuck. While prior estimates indicated that it would
cost aobut $15.9 billion to finish all five plants, the study concluded
that the true figure was about $23.8 billion, an increase of almost $8
billion. WPPSS now faced the prospect of having to raise more than $3
billion in financing in the next year--a year when the question of need
for power, slipping Supply System credibility, and skyrocketing interest
costs made the task increasingly difficult if not impossible.2 1 See
Figure 5.1 for a look at-estimated financing necessary to complete all
five projects.59 Advisors and the WPPSS Board of Directors, with the
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approval of Bob Ferguson, judged that a slowdown of WNP 4/5 had to begin
immediately, so that there would be enough money to complete the remain-
ing three projects. Financing of a little over $1 billion per year had
barely been possible before, and $3 billion was judged to be impossible
to obtain. Thus, on May 29, 1981, Ferguson recommended a six-month
slowdown on WNP 4/5. Not only were these plants the furthest from
completion, but at over $6 billion each they were the most expensive of
the five projects.31 At the same time, many people were beginning to
question the need for these plants, and Ferguson said, "The numbers are
just too large to handle without the total commitment and support of the
region". However, he held out the possibility that if interim studies
could firm up the need for the power and if conditions improved in the
bond market, construction might be resumed after six months without an
36,43increase in costs or loss of schedules.
The 88 Participants in WNP 4/5 were shocked by the recommendation
and faced with a most unpleasant decision. It was no longer possible to
finance the projects under the existing formula. The alternatives
presented by WPPSS's senior managing underwriters, including paying
interest during construction (IDC), were also unpalatable to most parti-
cipants. The Participants would have liked to expand the financial base
of the projects either by having them absorbed into the BPA System, like
WNP 1/2/3, or to attract additional participants from among the private
utilities and direct service industries, but this proved impossible.
BPA was constrained by the new Regional Power Act which made purchase of
generating facilities subject to the recommendations of a power planning
council. The Power Council, however, could not make a recommendation
until it completed its 20 year plan in April of 1983.
The Governors of Washington and Oregon then decided to step in to
handle this impasse. Realizing that the economy of the region was
linked in part to the fate of WNP 4/5, the governors named a three-man
expert panel to investigate the impact of the projects on the region's
utilities, businesses, and electric ratepayers. The panel recommended
that WNP 4/5 be mothballed to preserve the assets of the projects until
the need for power could be determined. The cost, they said, should be
shared by the participants and also include private utilities and large
industrial users of electricity. The Governor's Panel had strongly
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endorsed saving the plants becuase they were an important rei onal asset,
and the plan that emerged was a truly regional solution, involving
almost all the major utilities in the Northwest.16
The Panel estimated that mothballing the two plants for two years
would cost about $150 million. After a series of intensive negotia-
tions, a plan was proposed to Obtain the needed funding. The 88 parti-
cipants agreed to loan enough money to cover 60% of the costs while 3
private utilities and 11 direct service industries agreed to pay the
remaining 40%.42 Although loan commitments were met in November 1981,
by December and January the mothball plan began to fall apart.17'4 1
Some utilities maintained that they weren't legally able to put up their
share of the money, and others were then deterred by a clause in the
contract which would have required them to pay more than their oringinal
share to make up for utilities that could not or would not participate.
By early January, several of the largest participants electednot to
support the plan. Thus, on January 15, 1982, Ferguson announced that
the necessary funds for mothballing were not available.18 Having
explored all other sources of potential funding, he was legally obli-
gated to recommend termination of WNP 4/5. The WPPSS Board passed the
termination resolution on January 22, 1982.
Implementing an orderly termination of WNP 4/5 was now a paramount
concern of WPPSS. 3' Working with the Paricipants Committee, WPPSS set
up a special termination group to coordinate activities. The first task
was to ensure that sufficient funds were raised to cover costs of termi-
nation, including outstanding obligations to contractors and suppliers
and the costs of administering termination. To achieve this, the parti-
cipants were asked to loan WPPSS a minimum of $705 million, needed to
meet obligations in the first year, since the 88 participants are not
legally obligated to pay any termination costs until one year after
12
termination.12
The other task was (and is) to sell what assets can be sold at the
best price. The hope is to sell the two plants to a buyer who will
complete them as power units, but that hope is growing dimmer daily.
Efforts are being made, however, to preserve the construction license
and documentation as long as possible. If this fails, then whatever
major equipment or components can be salvaged will be sold. If this
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fails, the materials can be sold as scrap.
Since the January decision to terminate, there have been many devel-
opments in the financial situation of WPPSS. Total cost of shutting
down construction at WNP 4/5 was estiamted in February at $542 million
of which $188 million has been used to pay obligations since the con-
struction slow-down of July 1981. To meet the remaining $343 million in
direct costs, WPPSS has $12.3 million in 6ash on hand, $40.5 million in
an escrow account with BPA, $12.6 million from Pacific Power and Light
(the company owning a 10% share of WNP-5), $15 million in a termination
administration fund, and $41.3 million in interest income. The differ-
ence between the total $121.7 million held inreserve and $343 million
needed was to be made up of loans, mostly from the 88 participants.
Much of this money will be used to terminate about 300 contracts still
outstanding on WNP 4/5. Payment will be made on the basis of work
performed and a reasonable profit. This termination is complicated by
the twinning of plant 4 with 1 and 5 with 3, as this resulting in the
award of common contracts for much of the work. Under the termination
plan A/E payments - to United Engineers and Constructors, Inc. on WNP-4
and to Ebasco Services on WNP-5 - will be transferred from the dead twin
to the live one.18
The major cost facing the 88 participants is, however, the money
which has already been financed to build WNP 4/5. This debt amdnts to
about $2.25 billion now, and over the approximately 30 year life of the
bonds, with interest, will represent a payment of about $7 billion. In
September 1982, the utilities hired Shearson-American Express to invest-
igate a plan whereby BPA would borrow the money from the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, invest it in Treasury Notes and pay the utilities'
debts from the interest differential. This would reduce the total $7
billion payment over the 30 years by several billion dollars. Any move
by BPA to bail out the utilities would have to be approved by Congress,
however, and it may be difficult to get Congress to approve the subsidy
to the Pacific Northwest. But since it was partly BPAs forecasts of
power shortages that drew the utilities into the project, BPA may have
to do something to help them now.19 Another way in which utilities are
trying to escape their debt is through various court appeals of the
"hell or high water" clause in their contracts. In early October, 11
-75-
Oregon municiple utilities were told by a circuit court judge that htey
lacked authority in the first place to ever sign without voter approval
the "take-or-pay" contracts.19 Although WPPSS plans to appeal the
decision, it could affect a number of similar suits brought by rate-
payers against other participating utilities in Idaho and Washington.
No one right now is officially willing to comment on where the money
will come from to repay the debt or who will suffer financial loss if it
cannot be raised. However, everyone agrees that a default on this debt
would have major consequences for other Northwest public organizations
which need to raise money in the next few years. Uncertainty over the
WPPSS funds was already affecting financing for other projects in
February 1982. For example, the Snohomish County PUD thought it had
arranged a $261 million three-year letter of credit with Citibank of New
York for its Sultan River hydroelectric project on which it has received
favorable construction bids. But the bank is now asking questions about
how the PUD will be affected by the WNP 4/5 cancellation. Most experts
agree that until the WNP 4/5 termination is settled, no Northwest
utility will be able to finance anything.
WNP-1
WPPSS has, as of April 1, 1982, financed WNP-1 through the issuance
of $2.15 billion in bonds, and as of that date WNP-1 was about 61%
complete and scheduled for commercial operation in June 1986. However,
on April 29, 1982, WPPSS, upon the recommendation of the BPA, approved
the implementation of an extended construction delay of WNP-1 for a
period of up to five years.
The BPA cam& to this decision after much careful consideration. On
April 6, 1982, the Finance Committee of the WPPSS Executive Board
requested that BPA provide them advice as to the construction and
financing schedules for the three Net Billed Projects which the BP
Administrator would approve through fiscal year 1983. On April 19, the
Administrator recommended to WPPSS that: (1) the construction of
Projects 2 and 3 proceed at full pace; (2) the construction completion
schedule of Project I be extended for a period of up to five years; and
(3) the Executive Board instruct the WPPSS staff to prepare a budget and
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financing plan consistent with these recommendations. In developing
this recommendation, BPA performed economic and financial analyses, and
consulted with regional leaders, concerned individuals, and experts from
both inside and outside the region. On the basis of this, BPA concluded
that from the viewpoint of financing, marketing, resource economics,
load/resource balance, and contractual considerations, it would be
feasible and appropriate to extend the construction schedule of WNP-1
for up to five years. The near-term power surplus as currently forecast
by the BPA was probably the most pressing reason for extending the WNP-1
schedule. Also, very little additional financing will be necessary to
finish Projects 2 and 3.61
On May 1, 1982, after an appeal of a no work stoppage order granted
by the courts to a local union member, WPPSS initiated the extended
construction delay plan for WNP-1. 20 The goals of the plan include:
(1) the preservation of plant assets and existing project licenses; (2)
an orderly cessation of activities; (3) close-out of contracts and
payment of commitments; and (4) the minimization of cash expenditures.
It is easy to see why local labor was so upset about the slowdown.
Prior to the implementation of the delay, 6400 contractors and WPPSS
personnel were employed at WNP-1. The plan was to reduce manpower to
about 1,100 by September 1, 1982 and to about 300 by June 1, 1983.
Based on current cash flow projections for the extended construction
delay plan, WPPSS estimates that funds currently available, together
with investment income thereon, will be sufficient to meet cash flow
requirements on WNP-1 until October 1983. It is currently estimated
that from October 1983, up to $5 million per month could be required to
maintain WNP-1 for restart. Such funds will be provided by the BPA,
through funds on hand or additional borrowing, WPPSS's estimate of
increased total construction costs due to a five-year delay is $250 to
$350 million for demobilization, remobilization, and preservation of
assets, and up to $900 million due to escalation at an assumed 9%
compounded annual rate. 61
On May 20, 1982, the WPPSS Managing Director submitted alternatives
for the restart of construction on WNP-1 to the WPPSS Board of Directors
and the BPA. Such alternatives, which include a restart of construction
as early as January 1983, were submitted to the Board and BPA for the
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purposes of establishing basic assumptions necessary for the budget and
planning process. However, no assurance can be given by WPPSS or anyone
else that WNP-1 construction will ever be restarted, since the restart
depends on many future factors, such as power supply needs and the cost-
effectiveness of WNP-1 relative to other available resources, including
conservation.
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CHAPTER 6 -- CONCLUSION
This report has identified and briefly described each of the major
problems facing the nuclear industry today and has described one parti-
cular case of failure in detail. In various sections can be found
suggestions of ways to improve behavior or to solve problems, and these
will be brought together here.
The planning, construction, and operattion of a nuclear power plant
are very complex and use a great deal of time and resources. Most
public utilities, whose prior experience with electrical generation has
begun at the transformer, are not geared toward handling this complex
technology nor a project of this size. Even for utilities with some
experience in building and operating generating facilities, the nuclear
power plant project of today offers a great challenge. These utilities
must understand that there is a qualitative--not just quantitative--
difference between a nuclear power plant and other generating facilities
they may have constucted before. An important factor in determining the
level of success of a nuclear power plant project from the utility point
of view is the hiring of experienced and technically knowledgeable
personnel to handle the utility's portion of responsibility for the
project.
This utility management should hire an experienced and knowledgeable
project management firm at the very outset of the project. Demand
forecasts which make the project necessary should be scrutinized care-
fully by this team, since, as we have seen, it can be very difficult to
predict what demand will be more than ten years in the future. The
variation in possible demand, cost of the project, and the implications
for financing should also be discussed before the project begins. It
would be useful to know, for example, the point at which the project
would become so costly as to make future financing virtually impossible.
Another benefit of having a good project manager is that he can keep the
client up to date On cost and schedule changes which could influence
financing. When these changes are kept account of accurately, it may be
possible to identify and correct problems while there is still time. A
good project manager should be able to make any decisions about changing
technology which include realistic consideration of the risks of NRC
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refection and/or delay caused by the design change. The A/E and PM
industry should also work hard at improving nuclear technology, especi-
ally in light of the study mentioned in this report which indicates that
the utility may not be protected against enough safety risk at the
current level of regulation aimed at public safety. The oversight of a
project management firm with sophisticated project control of materials
handling and quality control documentation is also necessary for the
success of a nuclear project. This need for good project management was
demonstrated quite strikingly at WPPSS. After Bechtel took over on WNP-
2 and Ebasco on WNP-3, dismal completion rates and quality control
standards began to turn into record completion rates and commendations
for quality control by the NRC.
This report also indicates that the decade of the 1970s was a very
bad time to begin a nuclear power plant. Unexpectedly high inflation and
interest rates nearly doubled the original cost estimates of some
plants. Unprecedented amounts of new regulations probably doubled the
costs again. Added to all of this was the Carter administration's
oppostion to nuclear power and increasing public opposition. This
incredible increase in cost of nuclear power plants has dimmed the
original optimism of nuclear power proponents, and no new nuclear power
plants are being ordered today, even though most studies agree that
nuclear power is still a cheaper alternative than other energy sources.
The main reason for this lack of orders is that a nuclear power plant is
seen to be a very risky project to undertake. If costs tripled in this
decade, they might do it again in the next. It is even possible that
the NRC will come up with so many regulations as to make nuclear power
unviable, or another anti-nuclear president may be elected who even
seeks to make nuclear power illegal! Perhaps waste nuclear waste
disposal problems will not be solved, or a combined recession and con-
servation effort will keep demand increases low. With all these
uncontrolable variables to worry about and with billions of dollars at
stake, utilities are presently unwilling to consider building more
nuclear power plants.
When some of these uncertainties are cleared up, the author predicts
that orders for nuclear power plants will again begin to roll in. If
the NRC commits itself to a clear level of public safety requirements
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and begins to implement a waste disposal project at the urging of the
present Reagan administration, much of the fear and mystery will be
removed from nuclear power plant construction as opposed to other power
plant construction which shares to some extent the dangers of inflation,
interest rates, and decrease in forcast demand. Hopefully, when the
nuclear power plant industry again begins to boom, some of the sugges-
tions in this report will prove helpful in making the new projects more
successful than the old, and this case study might provide some insight
into specific problems and consequences of failure.
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